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Abstract: 
 
This study aims to provide an analysis of the factors which facilitate or impede the 
capacity of the portfolio committees of the South African National Assembly in the 
carrying out of the primary function of oversight. Parliamentary oversight presents 
itself as a key function of legislatures and further than this, serves as a primary 
indicator of the effectiveness of the legislature as a principle institution in the system 
of democratic governance. There has not been much contribution to the field of study 
of the committee system of the South African Parliament much less its institutional 
capacity. The dissertation conceptualised capacity as the “hard” physical resources 
available to the committees as well as the “soft” political environment in which the 
committee operates. The study made use of a number secondary documents 
relating to the work of committees along with data collected from interviews carried 
out with chairpersons and committee researchers. From an analysis of these 
variables in relation to a sample of committees, findings present a varied picture 
where capacity, in terms of both hard and soft variables, differ from one committee to 
the next. Overall committees differ from one to the next whether in terms of the 
scope of their oversight or their workload and this study found that capacity has to 
mirror these distinctions for effective oversight.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introductory Overview 
Much media and public attention has been placed on the theatrics and boisterous 
character the National Assembly of the South African Parliament has come to adopt 
given the change in opposition dynamics following the 2014 general elections. Scant 
attention has been paid to the importance of the committee system behind the doors 
of the House of the National Assembly. Academically, there has not been much 
contribution to the field of study of the committee system of the South African 
Parliament much less its institutional capacity. This has been echoed by Barkan who 
stated that “few systematic studies exist of the South African National Assembly… it 
has attracted little scholarly attention” (2005:5). 
This study hopes to contribute to the body of research looking at the South African 
parliamentary committee system by exploring the institutional capacity of the 
committee system. Barkan states that it has become common practice to broadly 
label legislative institutions as either “weak”, “strong”, “effective” or “ineffective” 
based on conventional wisdom (2005:1). This study wishes to build on the 
sentiments expressed by Barkan to essentially provide insight into the workings of 
the committee system based on the notion of structure and capacity of the 
committee system. 
Although the South African Parliament fulfils important functions relating to the 
drafting, deliberation and passing of legislation as well as an important vehicle for 
public participation, this study has a specific focus on legislative oversight in the 
South African context. Parliamentary oversight presents itself as a key function of 
legislatures and, further than this, serves as a primary indicator of the effectiveness 
of the legislature as a principle institution in the system of democratic governance. 
The capacity of the South African legislature to carry out this vital function will form 
an integral part of this study. 
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The South African Parliament has effectively had 20 years to establish itself 
institutionally. The South African Parliament has effectively cemented its mark as a 
cornerstone institution of the country’s constitutional democracy. The institution 
draws its powers firstly from the constitution – also the highest law in the land. The 
institution also has a vast array of rules developed through statutes which guide the 
work of the legislature and its committees. 
On the other hand, this structural capacity is one half of the duality which any 
legislative committee system needs to operate optimally. One has to take 
cognisance of the political dynamics or the political capacity giving rise to committee 
performance. Given the fact that since 1994, parliament has been dominated, in 
terms of numbers of seats, by the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), 
it has become common opinion that the party has used its numerical strength to 
push through legislation, ratify executive decisions and generally quash opposition 
dissent. Academic and general opinion has largely been that the South African 
Parliament has become more of a “rubber stamp” than a robust check on the 
government of the day. Pinpointing certain instances, for example, the endorsement 
of the Arms Deal, the passing of the Protection of State Information Bill and the 
President failing to answer questions orally in the House in 2014, easily explains the 
conventional thought, to use Barkan’s notion, of Parliament failing to use its teeth. 
This study hopes to explore these complex and interesting dynamics comprising the 
institutional capacity of the South African legislative committee system in performing 
oversight. Through this exploration, it is hoped that the commonly held broad 
brushstroke perceptions around the South African Parliament are informed by 
meaningful insights and findings. Furthermore, it is believed this study will generate 
useful information and data on the complex committee system. 
Although the literature review of this study will discuss the following in more detail, 
there are many international academic studies and papers looking specifically at 
legislative committee systems. Such bodies of studies and papers are lacking on the 
South African legislative committee system. More so, what is written on the case of 
South Africa is largely dated, which renders it of less use today. While there is a 
substantial body of research on oversight in the South African Parliament, not much 
of it is geared specifically toward looking at the committee system. In most work on 
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the South African Parliament, reference is made to specific committees without 
providing more detail or research into the operation or capacity of these committees 
to fulfil their mandates. 
1.2  Background to the Research Problem  
The idea for this study derived from a reading of Barkan’s (2005) study on the South 
African National Assembly after ten years of democracy in terms of whether the 
institution was an emerging legislature, marking its autonomy as an independent arm 
of the state or rubber stamp for the ruling party. 
In the paper, the author speaks of the importance of legislative capacity and 
pertinently highlights the disparity between the structural capacity of the South 
African Parliament and the political capacity in which the legislature is meant to 
flourish. Through some elaboration he reaches the conclusion that the conventional 
wisdom or slapping on of labels such as “rubberstamp” is not that easy and the case 
in South Africa is much more complex (Barkan, 2005). Although the paper makes 
reference to the committee system, most of the paper is written on the South African 
Parliament as a whole. What this thesis intends to do is build on this foundation laid 
by the Barkan paper and explore this capacity disparity further looking solely at the 
committee system of the National Assembly. Through this analysis, information 
would be generated on the operations and workings of the committees of the 
National Assembly specifically in the functional area of legislative oversight. After all, 
as stated by Murray and Nijzink (2002:63), “the most important work is done in 
committee(s)”. 
There is an important theoretical groundwork on which this study is based. To 
understand the discussion on institutional capacity, the dense theories related to 
institutionalism will to be waded through. It is necessary to look at primary 
assumptions engrained in the theory of institutionalism to give context to the 
institutional capacity of the South African legislative committee system. 
Subsequently, by looking at the theories underlying institutional capacity, this thesis 
will also substantially explore the critical theoretical assumptions behind oversight. 
By doing so, the discussion will also give an account of the rocky terrain of 
legislative-executive relations and the theory of the separation of powers which 
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cannot be divorced from a discussion on legislative oversight. Through this debate 
on the theoretical groundings and foundations, the study will also look at these 
assumptions through a useful comparative lens. There is a wealth of international 
literature from which to draw on which would certainly enrich this theoretical 
discussion and provide a thorough basis for the broader contextual dynamics to be 
discussed later in the case of the South African legislative committee system. 
1.3 Research Questions  
The primary research question forming the crux of this research study, reads: What 
are the factors which facilitate or impede the capacity of the South African 
parliamentary committees to perform oversight? The data collected in assisting in 
answering this question is limited to the last year (2013/2014) of the Fourth 
parliamentary term (2009-2014). The dissertation will also focus on the portfolio 
committees of the National Assembly as opposed to the select committees of the 
other House of the South African legislature, the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP). There are a number of sub-research questions and associated variables 
that assist in answering the main research question and these are discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
1.4 Committee Capacity  
One of the key focused questions which this study will provide information on is a 
greater understanding of how the committees of the South African parliament work 
and operate in this current era of the country’s democracy. It cannot be disputed that 
in any legislative institution committees are regarded as vital centres of power – the 
question remains in the case of South Africa whether portfolio committees 
specifically have strengthened or weakened as vital centres of power.  
The study will further focus on the oversight work of the committees. The function of 
holding the executive accountable is indisputably a vital role the legislature fulfils. At 
this point in the discussion, it is important to look at the rich theoretical framework 
providing the basis for many assumptions regarding legislative oversight. While the 
separation of powers is the normative ideal for any democratic arrangement of 
government, research shows many democracies carry the function of separating 
powers out differently depending on varying forms of government. Looking into these 
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various assumptions relating to legislative oversight will be a key focus area of this 
study.  
It is the capacity of the South African committee system to fulfil this function that 
forms the central point of analysis of this study. There is a vast and fascinating body 
of literature on institutionalism and theories on the institutionalism of legislatures 
specifically which this study will draw on to form a solid theoretical grounding for later 
analyses and discussion.  
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
As highlighted substantially throughout this introductory passage, looking at the 
institutional capacity of the South African committee system goes to the heart of this 
study. Furthermore, this study has conceptualised that institutional capacity is 
comprised of “hard resources” the committee system possesses along with the 
political system in which the committee system is grounded in. As mentioned the 
inspiration for this conceptualisation was drawn from the Barkan paper which 
highlighted the variables to consider when analysing the capacity of a fully 
developed legislature (2005: 2). Looking closely at these variables, which are also 
largely the overarching clustering of variables for the African Legislatures Project 
(ALP), it is observed that there is a clear distinction, as evident in the case of the 
South African National Assembly, between variables of a physical or structural 
nature, which this study has come to conceptualise as “hard” resources and then 
“soft” political resources which make up the environment in which committees 
operate. Conceptually, therefore, it is abstracted that both these factors make up the 
concept of institutional capacity in terms of the committee system.  
At this point it would be useful to provide further insight into the sub-variables which 
comprise the overarching variable this study has conceptualised as “hard” resources 
forming part of capacity. As mentioned previously, these are the variables which lend 
itself to quantitative analysis such as variables relating to the financial and budgetary 
resources available to committees and to what extent such resources are managed 
autonomously. Under this variable, the sub-variable relating to parliamentary staff of 
committees is also conceptually important. The experience and quality of research 
and administrative staff provided to committees are integral to the functioning of 
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committees and so would form an important aspect of institutional capacity. Another 
such sub-variable under this half of capacity would be related to the physical 
infrastructure available to committees. This study makes reference here to 
designated space for committees to meet when required to, computers and 
technology, library and research services. 
Similarly, there are sub-variables which comprise the complementary half of what 
this study conceptualises as institutional capacity – political dynamics. This 
overarching variable is not as simple to conceptualise, in terms of sub-variables, as 
the hard resources variable is. The sub-variables considered in terms of political 
dynamics are qualitative in nature. One sub-variable looked at would be the 
leadership of the chairperson. In the South African parliamentary committee system, 
chairpersons head committees and this leadership role is thus an important variable 
to consider. 
The experience, background, holding of other positions in the political party and 
length in office, would be some of the factors to discuss within this particular 
variable. South Africa makes use of a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral 
system which impacts, arguably, on the behaviour of committee members and 
chairpersons so the effect of this on committee capacity would also be important to 
explore. In further detail, the PR system essentially means individuals owe their 
parliamentary seat to the party as opposed to a constituency-based system where 
an individual would be directly voted for to occupy that seat. The assumption then is 
that members toe the party line to retain his or her seat. Another sub-variable to 
delve into under the political side of committee capacity would be relations between 
the committee and the department it is meant to oversee. Essentially this amounts to 
looking at executive-legislative relations and if such affects committee capacity. 
Similarly, issues related to the turnover of committee members and chairpersons are 
also worth looking at as a sub-variable under political dynamics. 
Formal rules and constitutionally-entrenched provisions ultimately give effect to the 
operationalisation of committees, or as van der Westhuizen neatly terms it, the 
scaffolding of Parliament (2014: 102). The South African parliamentary committee 
system is cushioned by a rich and extensive framework of rules and regulations 
which are intended to empower the functioning and execution of committee 
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mandates. As such, this consideration is an important factor in the institutional 
capacity of the legislatures and will be a key part of the discussion on the capacity of 
the South African committee system. 
1.6 Research Design and Methodology 
1.6.1 Type of Methodology Used     
 
The type of methodology used was largely qualitative in nature in terms of the 
research design, units of analysis and the data that was collected for this thesis. The 
secondary research and data gathered to form the theoretical grounding of the 
dissertation is classified as desktop research, also qualitative in nature. As such, the 
analytical or discussion section of the dissertation is qualitative in nature.  
 
As outlined earlier in the introduction, the institutional capacity framework of the 
study is set out in such a way that legislative institutional capacity can be polarised 
between “hard” resources or the physically tangible capacity legislatures possess 
and political capacity – the political will to carry out functions, political dynamics or 
the partisan environment in which the legislature operates - in other words, the 
aspects of institutional capacity which are intangible. In this polarised framework, the 
former half of capacity, the tangible resources, lends itself to somewhat of a 
quantitative indicator while the variables related to political dynamics, lends itself to 
more of a qualitative methodology. This will be elaborated on further in the 
discussion on the research design of the study.  
1.6.2 Unit of Analysis and Sampling   
 
The unit of analysis of this dissertation is that of the portfolio committee of the 
National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa. I have elected to look 
specifically at the last year of the fourth and previous parliament. To explain, the 
fourth parliament commenced after the fourth general election in 2009 until it was 
dissolved prior to the national and provincial election, which took place in May 2014. 
This dissertation has gathered data and maintained a focus on the last year of 
parliament being in operation (2013/2014). Due to time limitations and to allow for a 
narrowed focus on committee work, the study period of one year was chosen.  
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This dissertation elected to develop a deliberate and purposeful representative 
sample of portfolio committees. Given limitations of time and resources, it would 
simply not be possible for this dissertation to look at all portfolio committees. The 
committee system of the South African parliament largely mirrors the arrangement of 
departments in the executive at the time. One way of ensuring a representative 
sample of committees was to peg this to how government departments are clustered 
in South Africa:  
 
1. Infrastructure Development Cluster 
2.  Economic Sectors and Employment Cluster 
3. Governance and Administration Cluster 
4. Human Development Cluster 
5. Social Protection and Community Development Cluster 
6. International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster 
7. Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster 
In order to reach as representative a sample as possible, it was decided that the 
committees chosen should as far as possible be allocated in each of the clusters.  
 
Looking at the comprehensive list of portfolio committees and the departments or 
government ministries they shadowed at the time, three variables were elected on 
which to base the sample for purposes of it being as representative of the array of 
governance clusters as possible. The three variables investigated were: 
1. Departmental budgets for the year 2013 
2. Departmental staff complements for the year 2013   
3. Number of public entities1 the department was responsible for overseeing and 
which committees are also responsible for overseeing, for the year 2013 
                                                 
1  A public entity is defined as a (a) national government business enterprise; or (b) a board, commission, company, corporation, fund or 
other entity (other than a national government business enterprise) which is – (i) established in terms of national legislation; (ii) fully or 
substantially funded either from the National Revenue Fund, or by way of a tax, levy or other money imposed in terms of national 
legislation; and (iii) accountable to Parliament (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: 6) 
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These particular variables were identified as important as they reflect the oversight 
burden of committees which have to track departmental spending, functions which 
are affected by staff size and legislative/policy mandates which are also shared by 
the public entities.  
 
Looking at this information for the year under review for all government departments, 
it was decided, for the sample to capitalise on representativeness, it would have to 
be structured in such a way so as to include departments with the highest budget, 
staff complement and entities, those with the lowest numbers for all three variables 
as well as those departments located in the proverbial middle of the road or forming 
the averages for the variables investigated.  
 
An initial sample was reached but difficulties were encountered during surveys and 
interviews with chairpersons. To qualify, the dissertation was based on the last year 
of the previous (fourth) parliament which was the year 2013 - 2014. After compiling 
the interview questions, the Fifth Parliament (2014 - 2019) had already convened 
and a number of chairpersons in the original sample of committees had left the 
national legislature. Attempts to reach chairpersons proved extremely difficult as they 
were no longer in Cape Town and were tied up establishing themselves in various 
other areas of work post-chairing in the National Assembly. After some thought, the 
initial sample was amended slightly in light of these difficulties in securing interviews 
and the current sample on which the dissertation is based is as follows:  
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COMMITTEE SAMPLE 
 
CLUSTER COMMITTEE BUDGET 
(Final 
Appropriation) 
NO. OF 
ENTITIES 
(Reporting to 
the Minister) 
STAFF SIZE 
(Posts 
Filled) 
1. Infrastructure 
Development 
Energy R6 503 billion 6 
 
550 
2. Economic Sectors 
& Employment 
Trade and 
Industry 
R9 515 billion 14 1286 
3. Justice, Crime 
Prevention and 
Security 
Correctional 
Services 
R18 748 billion 0 41 825 
4. Economic Sectors 
and Employment 
Communications R2 372 billion 7 
 
333 
5. Social Protection 
& Community 
Development 
Social 
Development 
R118 511 billion 
 
3 678 
6. International 
Cooperation, 
Trade & Security 
Water & 
Environmental 
Affairs 
R10 375 billion + 
R5 206 billion = 
R15 581 billion 
16 + 4 = 20 7336 + 1588 
= 8924 
7. Justice, Crime 
Prevention & 
Security 
Police R68 791 billion 3 194 852 
 
The above sample is still satisfactorily representative in terms of governance clusters 
as well as providing for a diverse basis through which to compare and contrast 
committees.  
 
Once the sample was decided on, the dissertation sought assistance from the 
African Legislatures Project (ALP), run by the Centre for Social Science Research. 
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The purpose of the ALP was to undertake comparative research into the internal 
functioning of the African legislatures. Based on the project description, the ALP has 
one foot in academic research and another in practice. The project was guided by 
three overarching questions relating to the functioning of African legislatures, the 
development and transformation of African legislatures as institutions to support 
fragile democracies and what constitutes best practice for strengthening African 
legislatures.  
 
In attempting to answer these questions, the ALP developed a range of measures to 
look at legislative performance in order to assess and compare African legislatures 
comparatively over time. This dissertation has made use of some of the variables 
utilised by the ALP in assessing the performance of legislatures in Africa – such 
variables included the structure of committees (for example, how many members 
serve on the committee), parliamentary staff (for example, if the legislature has a 
research unit, if IT services are provided to the legislature and if it has a library) and 
physical infrastructure of the legislature (for example dedicated office/meeting 
spaces). While the ALP focused on the legislature in its entirety, this dissertation 
focuses solely on committees of the South African parliament so only variables 
applicable to committees were utilised from the ALP. The ALP also developed a 
survey for Members of African legislatures – this dissertation made use of the 
questions posed in this survey for the interviews conducted with the chairpersons of 
the South African parliament. The questions related to members’ background 
(chairperson in the case of this dissertation), the role of the member (or chairperson 
in the case of this dissertation) and parliamentary resources. While the ALP survey 
required MPs to select from various answers, the interviews this dissertation made 
use of allowed for qualitative answers by the respondents and were thus more open-
ended.  
 
The dissertation collected a variety of data to compile these committee worksheets 
which worked as useful “fact sheets” on basic information related to each committee 
in the sample. These fact sheets are attached in addendum to the dissertation. 
Detailed minuted reports were collected from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
(PMG) which provided useful accounts of the interactions of the sampled committees 
with departments and entities in various oversight-themed discussions and 
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considerations as well as the legacy reports produced by committees at the end of a 
parliamentary term.  
 
To form the various chapters which relate to the literature review and other 
theoretical concepts, the dissertation collected a number of secondary research 
pieces and papers from both global and local academics and parliamentary 
commentators as well as previous work on the topic of this dissertation.  Data was 
also collected about the formal rules and organisational structure of the legislature 
through a number of secondary sources such as the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Rules of the National Assembly and committee legacy reports 
This data collected was complimented by interviews conducted with chairpersons 
and content advisers of the committees in the sample. Interviews were carried out 
with five chairpersons and five research associates (committee content advisers and 
researchers). Some of the research associate interviews were filled out via email 
while one, along with all interviews with the five chairpersons, were conducted in 
person. The interviews were held between the months of February and June 2015.  
 It should be stated however that for some of the surveys, interviews were conducted 
with chairpersons of the committees in the current Fifth Parliament due to the 
difficulties alluded to earlier in securing interviews with chairpersons who had not 
returned after the Fourth Parliament rose. These were only for two of the committees 
and it was discussed that the chairpersons were not new to the National Assembly 
having chaired previous committees or been MPs previously. The sample of 
committees were not amended to reflect this because it would have rendered the 
sample not as representative as it could have been, Difficulties were also 
experienced in securing interviews with content advisers and researchers of 
committees in the sample so it was elected to contact as many research support 
staff members as possible. As a result, a two of the interviews were conducted with 
content advisers who did not work on the committees in the sample but seeing as 
the interview questions were not very committee-specific, the responses were 
adequate for use. Again, the sample of committees were not amended to reflect this 
because it would have rendered the sample not as representative as it could have 
been. Although one researcher was interviewed, content advisers were aimed for as 
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they are the most senior staff member on the committee and so were assumed to be 
pivotal sources of information. Limitations were experienced with some chairpersons 
and research staff having moved on from the national legislature after the Fourth 
Parliament rose while further limitations were experienced with some research staff 
expressing unwillingness to participate in the interviews – these limitations prompted 
the interview of content advisers and researchers who were willing to participate. To 
reiterate, the sample was not amended in order to maintain its representative 
character and due to the interviews questions not being too committee-specific, the 
findings were not negatively affected.  
The interview questions for research associates related mostly to resource and 
structural capacity probing opinions on sufficient capacity and support, committee 
budgets, other committee staff and physical resources. The interviews for 
chairpersons directly probed the backgrounds of the chairpersons before moving 
on to question issues relating to oversight and accountability, impediments to 
oversight, relations with the executive compliance and members through which to 
develop findings related to political dynamics. The chairpersons were probed on 
variables relating to structural resources in order to draw inferences on physical 
resource capacity. 
Chapter Outlines: 
Chapter Two: 
This chapter will survey the relevant literature, both at local and international level, 
on institutional capacity of legislative committees. The review will look at what 
studies have addressed the question area of this study. Specifically the review will 
address the approaches, methods and evidence produced in the body of literature 
surveyed and importantly the main assumptions or conclusions reached. This 
chapter assists in establishing an important basis for comparative discussion and 
to set the scene for further debate on the theoretical framework to follow. The 
chapter will also consider relevant theories for studying legislative capacity. As 
highlighted in the introduction, when discussing legislative capacity, there is a large 
body of work contributing toward the relevant theories. This chapter will explore 
how the issue of legislative capacity was addressed by various papers and authors 
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particularly in terms of its link to institutionalism and then also challenges with this 
capacity.  
Chapter Three:  
In this chapter research design and methodology will be stated and discussed and 
the choice of such design and methodology will be qualified in detail. This chapter 
will elaborate on data collection methods, data analysis, research sample and 
population, data validity and reliability, ethical considerations as well as research 
constraints and significance of the research. 
Chapter Three   
Chapter three describes the hard resources making up one half of the concept of 
institutional capacity as envisioned by this dissertation. Discussion will be held on a 
number of subvariables falling within this variable using the committee sample 
explained earlier.  The direction for the analysis is to consider findings related to how 
the various subvariables contribute to the institutional capacity of the South African 
legislative committee system. The central spotlight remains on legislative oversight 
and how the committee system is capacitated to fulfil this crucial function.  
 
Chapter Four:  
Chapter four is concerned with the complementary variable – political dynamics - 
forming the concept of institutional capacity as envisioned by this dissertation. 
Discussion will be held of a number of subvariables falling within this variable using 
the committee sample explained earlier. The direction for the analysis is to consider 
findings related to how the various subvariables contribute to the institutional 
capacity of the South African legislative committee system. The central spotlight 
remains on legislative oversight and how the committee system is capacitated to fulfil 
this crucial function. 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
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The concluding chapter summarises the findings of this dissertation as contained in 
chapter four and five, returning the discussion to some of the research questions 
posed at the beginning of this paper and overall making key closing observations on 
the discussion of institutional capacity.  
 
Summary  
This introductory chapter has established the conceptualisation of institutional 
capacity in the case of the committee system of the South African legislature. The 
primary thought behind this concept is that institutional capacity is a two-fold notion 
comprising of hard resources on the one hand and political dynamics on the other. 
Oversight is one of the salient functions of any legislative institution and it is the 
objective of this dissertation to draw critical conclusions on the institutional capacity 
the committee system of the National Assembly of the South African parliament to 
carry out this essential function. This chapter has established the overall framework 
from which the analysis contained in this dissertation will develop.  The introduction 
has also covered research design and methodology and qualified the choice of 
design and methodology. It has also elaborated on the sampling method, data 
sources as well as constraints.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Reviewing the Literature on Legislative Oversight 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the conceptualisation of 
institutional capacity as it relates to legislative committee systems. This chapter also 
has the purpose of reviewing and presenting studies and research, both locally and 
internationally, on the ideas of institutional capacity in terms of legislative committees 
with a specific focus on the oversight role of legislatures. The main thrust of 
reviewing the literature in this chapter is to establish the general assumptions, 
findings and conclusions drawn in terms of institutional capacity of legislative 
committees as is in line with the theme of this dissertation  
It seems fitting that this review chapter be kicked off by looking at the study from 
which this dissertation draws its inspiration – Joel Barkan looking at the South 
African National Assembly after ten years of democracy and if the institution could be 
named an emerging legislature or rubber stamp (2005). Barkan sets off his research 
by highlighting the salient variables which make any legislative institution, in 
essence, powerful especially when compared to executive bodies which they 
oversee. He outlines that a functioning legislature needs to be grounded in formal 
rules, offer competitive salaries to its members (so that they do not rely on 
clientalism), resources, the divide of seats between the ruling and opposition parties 
and the party political composition of the legislature (2005: 2).  
Barkan then goes on to discuss the structural and political context of the South 
African National Assembly (Barkan’s unit of analysis in this paper) as an exception to 
other African legislatures. He notes “few systematic studies exist of the South African 
National Assembly. In marked contrast to South Africa’s constitution and electoral 
system, the national legislature has attracted little scholarly attention” (2005: 5). 
Before he outlines his research findings and analysis, the author clearly sets out the 
main assumptions (or what he terms “conventional wisdom”) of the South African 
National Assembly. These assumptions include that the institution is weak and 
serves as a mere rubber stamp even though it has all the “formal accoutrements” of 
a developed legislature i.e. a broad committee system, established rules, supporting 
staff and advanced physical capacity (Barkan, 2005: 5).To further contextualise, 
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Barkan bases his “conventional wisdom” assumption on the fact that South Africa is, 
or at the time the paper was written, a one-party dominant political system. 
Furthermore, members of the National Assembly are elected via a closed list PR 
system – this prompted members to always act in line with party allegiances. Added 
to this was the fact that the ANC (dominant party) was largely centralised under the 
leadership of previous President Thabo Mbeki – this extended to ANC behaviour in 
Parliament and the general “culture” of parliamentary politics at the time (Barkan, 
2005: 6; 7 & 11). This centralised culture has changed substantially since 2006 and 
no longer comes to characterise the legislature, or ANC caucus, in the current 
context.  
 After debating further political dynamics especially around internal politics of the 
dominant ANC and the electoral system used, Barkan finds there is more to the 
conventional wisdom of the South African National Assembly than assumed. The 
author then comes to explain the framework of the paper by laying out what 
institutional capacity comprises of. This includes a host of variables relating to the 
training of members, how active members are in committee, effective leadership by 
the chairperson, support staff, financial resources, technology and physical 
infrastructure (Barkan, 2005: 14).  
This study found the conceptualisation of institutional capacity as defined by Barkan, 
an interesting stepping stone to use for a current discussion of the capacity of the 
South African committee system as the Barkan paper is quite dated. I say this 
because not only was the paper written more than 10 years ago but many of the 
assumptions Barkan based his conclusions on, as described earlier in the review, 
has changed. For example, parliamentary politics and the growth of the opposition in 
Parliament are starkly different to what it was in 2005 and the centralised culture of 
the ANC, as discussed by Barkan has changed.   
Where Barkan makes reference to the National Assembly in its entirety, this study 
intends to use the framework laid, draw on it and apply it to committees specifically 
to allow for a narrower and more focused discussion. In looking at the variables 
analysed by Barkan, this dissertation came to find that some of the variables lent 
themselves to a more structural analysis of capacity based on “hard” findings. This 
was compared to other variables which fell into a category which was more political 
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in nature and so lent itself to an analysis of “soft” findings. Whereas Barkan does not 
disaggregate his findings along such lines, it would make for interesting discussion to 
contrast the “hard” to the “soft” variables. Furthermore the study aims to build on the 
analysis of the conventional wisdom of the South African legislature and to challenge 
simple assumptions made about the capacity of the legislature and specifically its 
committee system.  
Barkan concludes that the answer to the question of whether the South African 
National Assembly is a rubber stamp or emerging legislature is ambiguous at best 
and depends on how one views the discussion outlined (2005: 20). These are points 
on which this dissertation hopes to build.   
A paper looking at African legislatures collectively in terms of an analysis of 
institutional capacity and public perceptions is that belonging to Nijzink, Mozaffar and 
Azevedo (2006). The authors find that the existing literature on African legislatures 
tend to review these institutions uniformly instead of being cognisant of cross-
national nuances (Nijzink et al., 2006:4). This is potentially due to the fact that not 
much is written about individual African legislatures, according to the authors, and 
that there are a number of internal dynamics, variables and factors to consider about 
African legislatures before assumptions can be made about the legislative capacity 
of the continent broadly. The authors note that these dynamics are linked to varying 
constitutional provisions and formal rules, internal structure of the legislatures and 
available resources (Nijzink et al, 2006: 4). Furthermore, the authors discuss that 
poor conclusions are drawn about Africa legislatures because studies fall short in 
providing criteria against which to analyse or measure the institutions in terms of key 
legislative functions (Nijzink et al, 2006: 4).    
In their observations on the capacity of African legislatures, the authors note that 
Africa has a varying picture of capacity as it could be determined by the diverse 
development trajectories of countries. Analysis by Nijzink et al find that a country like 
South Africa received support from donor programmes and international 
organisations which went a long way in propping up the legislative capacity of the 
country in the early 90s. This is in contrast to, for example, the parliaments of 
Cameroon or Swaziland which lacked this “support to strengthen their institutional 
capacity” (Nijzink et al, 2006: 5). The authors further remark that African legislatures 
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have differing access to resources, power and autonomy which impact on legislative 
capacity. To make this point, the parliament of South Africa again is juxtaposed in 
terms of resources to that of Malawi - the former is relatively well resourced in terms 
of extensive office space, support staff of the legislature and a substantial budget 
while the latter worked from temporary office space and lacked adequate support 
staff (Nijzink et al, 2006: 6).  
Legislative capacity in Africa also varies according to the size of the institutions from 
country to country where the spectrum would range from 63 members in Botswana 
to a 400-member strong legislature in South Africa. The authors elucidate that the 
size of the parliament primarily influences capacity in that human resources are one 
of the most important components of capacity – members have skills and, simply 
put, the more members there are, the more legislative work can get done (Nijzink et 
al, 2006: 7). Further analysis of the paper brings to the fore the fact that resources 
and member-size of the legislature are intricately tied – legislatures with larger 
member numbers have the resources to sustain those members. These resources 
relate to funds to cover salaries, employ more staff and ensure an adequate working 
environment. African legislatures with far less members lack that particular resource 
as well as other structural and financial resources (Nijzink et al, 2006: 7).The Nijzink 
et al paper was useful for exploring potential variables to use in the discussion of 
legislative institutional capacity such as resourcing and size of the legislature in 
terms of members. The paper was also constructive when looking at powers 
conferred to African legislatures as informed by constitutional design.  
Capacity is a wide area in which there lie many definitions and varying 
conceptualisation of the term. Bagenholm put forward that capacity is closely related 
to performance and capability where effectiveness, efficiency and efficacy are the 
trio of terms often used to discuss this capacity (Bagenholm, 2008: 25). This is 
further used in reference to outcomes or outputs or where there is some result to talk 
of. For the effectiveness of outcome-related activities then, some capacity is needed 
for the institution to be able to perform (Bagenholm, 2008: 25). The paper rightly 
outlines that there are then various indicators of capacity, which vary depending on 
the study in question, and from there, findings or assessments could be made about 
institutional performance (Bagenholm, 2008: 26).  
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This conceptualisation is complemented by Krause who discusses legislative 
capacity as the means through which the institution carries out its primary functions 
and roles. Such a characterisation is useful because it makes the distinction that a 
legislative institution could be emboldened through legislative rules or empowered 
through the constitution but then could lack the means, or capacity, to effect its 
functions optimally (Krause, 2003: 6). To further build on this conceptualisation, 
Krause is ultimately outlining that legislative rules and constitutional provisions are 
the tools at the disposal of committees while capacity is the capability or means 
through which the conceptual tools are used. There is then often a disjuncture 
between the committees having the power to effect change and the capacity to in 
fact do so.  
Nijzink et al also offer a useful conceptualisation of capacity as “the instruments that 
give parliaments the potential to exert influence and perform their main 
responsibilities of law-making, oversight and representation” (2006: 6). This is further 
specified as the powers and the extent of autonomy the legislature enjoys and then 
the physical resources, namely, infrastructural, financial and human resources, 
which the institution can make use of (Nijzink et al, 2006: 6). In unpacking this 
further, Nijzink et al conceptualise capacity as the means or the space in which 
legislative committees carry out their salient functions and influence 
political/government decisions or actions. Effective capacity in this sense is 
dependent on material resources and autonomy/power to act. The paper outlines 
that the physical resources relate chiefly to research and administrative support 
(human resources) and office space while political autonomy as a resource is 
thought of as constitutional design and executive-legislative relations (extent of the 
separation of powers).  
Capacity is commonly associated with physical resources particularly in terms of 
infrastructure, equipment and human resources but in the case of legislatures, 
political capacity is a vital component of ensuring that legislative committees fulfil 
their mandate. Norton argues that physical resources and support staff do not 
necessarily ensure a function is executed or in fact “may count for nought if they 
[parliamentarians] lack the will to question and challenge the executive especially if 
their party is in power” (Norton, 2011: 7). Resources and the political will to execute 
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functions are thus equally vital components of legislative capacity. In analysing the 
paper further, Norton states that political will is a critical component of the capacity of 
committees as it is a means to effectively carry out essential functions and influence 
policy or decisions taken by government or the executive. Members of committees 
have to possess the determination to carry out the task of maintaining oversight and 
accountability – the legislative function this dissertation is focused on (Norton, 2011: 
7). Norton makes the point that political will and adequate resources work hand in 
hand when conceptualising legislative capacity (2011: 8).  
Institutional capacity is the foundation of the legislature and its committees so then it 
could be argued that where this capacity is lacking, the adequate execution of the 
institution’s mandated functions is compromised. Legislatures are often viewed as 
strong or effective when there is sufficient capacity to enable the institution to fully 
carry out its core functions. Capacity is then essential for institutional functioning and 
is the base from which all legislative action springs.  
2.1 Constitutional Framework: Oversight in the case of the South African 
Parliament  
The progressive South African Constitution outlines the primary responsibilities of 
the legislature as being threefold – passing of legislation, providing a national forum 
for the consideration of issues and scrutinising and overseeing the executive. While 
the Constitution does not speak specifically to committees as such, it provides the 
institution with powers through which to conduct its responsibilities. In terms of 
legislative oversight, section 55 highlights the National Assembly must ensure all 
executive organs of state must be accountable to it and to maintain oversight of 
these executive bodies. The subsequent section speaks to the fact that the House 
and its committees have the right to:  
a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or 
affirmation, or to produce documents; 
b) require any person or institution to report to it; and  
c) compel, in terms of national legislation or the rules and orders, any person or 
institution to comply with a summons or requirement in terms of paragraph (a) 
or (b) 
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These powers and constitutional provisions function to empower the legislative 
committees to fully execute its mandate of oversight for the ultimate aim of 
accountability. Academics and commentators, such as Nijzink & Pombobo2, remark 
that these powers are simply theoretical and appear ideal on paper but it could be 
argued that this does not negate the fact that those powers do stand and could be 
used should a committee require it. This provides a solid base from which capacity is 
built on and clearly lays out what is expected from the executive and what can be 
expected if there is non-compliance. This is reinforced by section 92 (2) “Members of 
the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the 
exercise of their powers and the performance of their function” and 92 (3) “Members 
of the Cabinet must - (a) act in accordance with the Constitution; and (b) provide 
Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control”. In its 
discussion on this section, Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau highlight that executive 
responsibility is brought to the forefront and this responsibility to be held accountable 
by the legislature is enforced by the highest piece of legislation (1999: 14). There is a 
two-sided dynamic at play here that Corder et al underscore in that as much as 
these constitutional provisions emphasise the importance of executive accountability, 
on the other hand, there is a “corresponding recognition that the National Assembly 
has a constitutional obligation to scrutinise and oversee executive action” (Corder et 
al, 1999: 14). This point is further clarified when the authors explain a court would 
usually not compel a minister to resign for mismanagement of his or her portfolio 
without the legislature putting the framework in place to hold the executive member 
accountable in such respects.  
In reviewing the literature on committee effectiveness, Honeyman highlights Larkin 
who finds that analysis of committee systems must be cognisant of the powers 
available to legislative committees such as whether committees can instigate 
enquiries or set its agenda without interference – such characteristics are the 
cornerstone of what are considered effective committees (Honeyman, 2013: 7). In 
thinking of this paper further, positive connections are drawn between committee 
effectiveness and the extent of powers conferred to it. It is from this starting point 
                                                 
2 Nijzink, Lia & Piombo, Jessica. 2004. “The Institutions of Representative Democracy”. Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) 
Working Paper No. 58. Page 6. Retrieved: 10 June 2015 From:  
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that this chapter will consider and discuss the network of powers, rules and 
provisions embedding portfolio committees as the nucleus of the institution.   
Unpacking the concept of legislative oversight  
In my understanding, at its most basic core, oversight is one of the paramount 
functions of legislative institutions and drills down to the very crux as to why 
legislatures were established and designed. Oversight is conceptually grounded in 
its very name – the legislature keeping a watchful and scrutinising view over the 
executive and government action to ensure there is good governance and 
transparency, public funds are being used appropriately and that generally the will of 
the public is represented. With oversight being a primary function of the legislature, 
holding government/executive accountable, accountability is the tool through which 
oversight is carried out – oversight and accountability are thus intrinsically linked. 
Accountability is thought of as putting oversight into action – oversight is carried out 
by the legislature when it holds the executive/government answerable or responsible 
for, example, a particular policy developed, how public funds were utilised or why a 
certain appointment was made in a public entity. The legislative committee system is 
a key conduit through which oversight plays itself out as it is in committee that 
Ministers and government officials are directly held responsible. In essence, much of 
the work of the legislature is rooted in the function of maintaining oversight – 
Friedberg and Hazan highlight the definition of oversight as captured by Ogul (1976) 
“[oversight is] behaviour by legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively, 
which results in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behaviour” (Friedberg 
and Hazan, 2012: 3).   
Understanding and conceptualising the web of legislative oversight, accountability 
and responsibility is coherently dealt with in the Corder Report, on parliamentary 
oversight and accountability, when the authors frame oversight, as a function of the 
legislature, as grounded in the separation of powers. To carry out the function 
optimally, the institution requires specific powers -primarily the power to hold the 
executive accountable. It is acknowledged that the legislature is conferred extensive 
powers but the many ways in which these powers are used and the execution of the 
function of oversight, varies (Corder et al, 1999: 3). The Report posits oversight as 
the “monitoring or review of actions” (1999: 2).  
28 
 
The scope of legislative oversight by the South African parliament over public 
institutions and organs of state was addressed in a 2006 study by the Human 
Science Research Council (HSRC). The study made a number of pertinent remarks 
in reference to oversight and accountability particularly linking it to provision and 
access to information (HSRC, 2006: 10). Further discussion shows that 
accountability is effective when truthful information is made available to legislators, 
and ultimately the public, and it is through this provision of information that the 
legislature keeps the executive/government accountable for what it says it has done 
(HSRC, 2006: 10). The report cites Coghill who argued that “the flow of information 
was the lifeblood of accountability” (HSRC, 2006: 11).  
The aim of the report is to strengthen the role of parliament in performing its 
oversight mandate and ensuring accountability specifically in reference to organs of 
state. The report situates itself in discussion on oversight and accountability and how 
it can best be understood and for this it extensively quotes the Corder report. The 
report also makes a compelling argument that “legislative oversight is largely an 
instrumental means designed to ensure as well as influence executive 
accountability”. Ultimately that translates as oversight being part of the core rationale 
and deeply rooted in how legislatures are designed – this oversight function is there 
to ensure the executive is accountable, answerable and responsible to the 
legislature. This is useful to state because, as the report goes further to elucidate, 
the quality of executive accountability is an almost direct reflection of the strength of 
parliamentary oversight (HSRC, 2006: 10).  
Oversight in the case of South Africa has also been written extensively on by Judith 
February - in one article she finds that the institution has carried out this pertinent 
function patchily at best (February, 2006: 2). She also makes specific reference to 
committees of the National Assembly that tie in with existing arguments, namely, that 
some committees exercise its oversight responsibility with greater vigour than others 
(February, 2006: 2).  
The legislature in itself is not absolved of accountability – the Constitution clearly 
outlines that the legislature is comprised of public representatives having acquired 
their seats in a democratic election. These representatives are accountable to the 
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electorate - this responsibility is one of the primary drivers for executing the mandate 
of oversight (Corder et al, 1999: 10).  
Although not within the scope of this study, there is also a body of empirical studies 
into legislative oversight at the provincial level and, as cited in a Human Science 
Research Council (HSRC) report into organs of state accountable to and overseen 
by parliament, the executive is undoubtedly accountable to the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) and the Council has a significant oversight role to play as part of 
an intergovernmental framework (2006: 7 - 8). Furthermore, the Report outlines that 
the Constitution speaks to the executive being accountable to Parliament as a whole 
– as Parliament is comprised of two Houses, the function of oversight does include 
the NCOP and the executive is as accountable to the Council as it is to the Assembly 
(HSRC, 2006: 7). The Report also points out that the oversight function of the NCOP 
is unique in that it holds the executive/government accountable in terms of particular 
provincial interests as is the rationale for the establishment of this House (HSRC, 
2006: 7).   
Rapoo has written on rating the effectiveness of legislative oversight methods and 
techniques at provincial level where a number of interesting observations were 
made. The paper makes the point that oversight techniques utilised in the provincial 
legislatures can be grouped into two broad camps – “house based” or internal 
oversight such as scrutinising annual reports and performance plans and then 
“fieldwork” oversight techniques which pertain largely to oversight trips to physical 
sites. Rapoo highlights that provincial legislatures have used both methods of 
oversight to “varying degrees” (2004: 3). There are both positive and negative 
aspects of each oversight method but Rapoo finds that the provincial legislatures 
make more use of “house based” techniques (2004: 4). He says that this is due to 
constraints faced by the legislatures given the Westminster-based system and that 
the “executive has tended to dominate the legislature...[which] tends to render the 
legislature institutionally weaker than the executive” particularly at the provincial level 
(Rapoo, 2004: 5). Furthermore, provincial legislatures lack the resources to conduct 
comprehensive “fieldwork” oversight.  Useful for the findings to follow in this 
dissertation, Rapoo also makes reference to institutional relations between the 
executive and legislature especially in relation to asymmetries of resources, 
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particularly information – such structural dynamics impacts the provincial legislatures 
as they do the national legislature.   
In terms of an analysis of the findings of the most effective techniques of oversight 
as rated by senior public service officials, the method which allows for departmental 
officials to appear directly before the legislative committee is deemed highly effective 
because of the direct line of oversight and accountability it is perceived to carry 
(Rapoo, 2004: 13). This is due to the nature of such in-house meetings where senior 
officials and the executive appear directly before the committee, are obligated to 
answer questions there and then and submit reports and required information for the 
committee to use to fulfil its mandate of oversight.  
2.2 Oversight as a dynamic in legislative-executive relations 
Oversight is mandated to legislatures as part of the check and balance system which 
stems from the separation of powers between the three branches of state (Corder et 
al, 1999: 3). Shephard (2004) writes that in parliamentary systems, usually those of 
Westminster character, oversight is constitutionally set out owing to the blending of 
executive and legislative branches of the state. Calland (2006: 62) makes reference 
to Walter Bagehot, who when writing of The English Constitution (1867) states, “the 
efficient secret of the English constitution may be described as the close union, the 
nearly complete fusion, of the executive and the legislative powers…A cabinet is a 
combining committee – a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative 
part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origins it belongs to the one, 
in its functions it belongs to the other”. This is starkly juxtaposed against a 
presidential system, of which the US Congress is a prime example, where the 
legislative and executive branches are elected separately and function completely 
independently of each other. The differentiation is neatly laid out by Calland who 
explains that “[T]he Westminster system does not offer a true separation of powers 
between executive and legislature - it separates functions rather than powers” 
(Calland, 1999: 8). This is significant for this study because it lays bare the dynamics 
at play when discussing oversight and accountability in the South African legislature 
due to its Westminster roots and institutional design. Friedberg and Hazan argue that 
this design “greatly weakens” legislative oversight (2012: 8). They further state that 
this structure makes for a “reactive legislature” given the weakened oversight 
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function as compared to the “infinitely stronger oversight evident in a presidential 
democracy” (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012: 9 & 10).  
Calland outlines that the differentiation of systems holds different assumptions for 
the “power relations between the legislature and the executive” (Calland, 2006: 46). 
The executive is viewed to, more often than not, dominate the legislature because of 
clear resources imbalances or asymmetries. As elaborated on by Calland, this is 
often discussed in terms of expertise, resources and budgets (Calland, 1999: 8). 
This is a point which this study will discuss in greater length in subsequent chapters 
in relation to the South African parliamentary committee system. 
To attempt to tie these strands laid out together, parliamentary oversight fulfils an 
essential democratic function of being a check and balance on executive power and 
authority. The idea of parliamentary oversight functioning as an effective check and 
balance is met with the idea of ensuring accountability – of the executive by the 
legislature through mechanisms of oversight (Corder et al, 1999: 9). Senay and 
Besdziek (1999) interestingly remark that the function of effective and thorough 
parliamentary oversight over the executive is emphasised because of the intimate 
connection between the executive and legislature in the case of South Africa - 
because of South Africa’s Westminster roots and the constitutional design of fusion 
between executive and legislative arms of the state given that they both originate 
from the legislature, this fusion further emboldens the need for parliamentary 
oversight to ensure the legislature keeps the executive in check. Besdziek and 
Senay state that in the US system, because there is already such a strict separation 
of powers between the executive and legislature, the check and balance function 
occurs more organically (1999).  
An assumption and point made that repeatedly makes itself clear when reviewing the 
body of work on legislative committees and oversight, as is the case with the South 
African literature, is that the executive tends to be better resourced than legislatures. 
This is so in terms of financial resources, human resources, infrastructure etc. This 
has come to skew executive-legislative relations where access to resources arguably 
leads to the common assumption that the executive is the more powerful of the two 
institutional arms of state. The point is highlighted by Alabi who states that “the US 
Congress, like all other legislative bodies in the complex world of the 20th century, 
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declined relative to that of the so-called executive branch of government” (Alabi, 
2009: 234). This decline, Alabi argued, was in part due to strengthening cabinets and 
executives, and in the case of the US, a President with veto power and power to 
make policy decisions (2009: 234). He goes on to say that this assumption has also 
displayed itself in the less developed parliaments of Africa citing the examples of 
Uganda and Nigeria. The Alabi paper on legislatures in Africa highlights legislative-
executive relations and how these dynamics play themselves out in different 
institutional designs – pertinent assumptions are made which applies to this 
dissertation in its discussion on findings particularly in relation to political dynamics, 
for parliamentary committee capacity. The paper also forms part of the literature 
reviewed by this dissertation in establishing the general assumptions of legislative 
capacity. 
Alabi states that not only are executive arms of the state more superior compared to 
the legislative in terms of significant resources and access to funds, but also in terms 
of infrastructure and training (Alabi, 2009: 239). A fascinating point made in this 
piece is that it has become commonplace that while legislatures and their 
committees remain the face of robust, functioning democracy, it is more so in a 
figurative way as opposed to the reality where the executive disproportionately tilts 
the scales in power relations between the two arms of the state (Alabi, 2009: 240). 
Speaking specifically on the legislatures in Africa, this argument is centred on the 
premise that while these legislatures have well-designed constitutional powers to 
carry out their functions effectively, they fall short on possessing the capacity to carry 
out these functions as theoretically intended. The executive however is not lacking in 
this capacity. This gives rise to the “relative institutional dwarfing” of the legislature 
by the executive (Alabi, 2009: 239). This complements the firm assumption that while 
legislatures are grounded in formal statutes, rules and constitutional frameworks 
(where the symbolic power comes from), it is in fact the executive that enjoys access 
to a far wider range of resources and budget and this is where the authentic power 
lies in the relationship.  
This point is further illuminated in the conclusions made by Baldwin in terms of 
scrutinising legislative weakness and strengths where he states that “the reality of 
the position today is that real power resides in the executive – not in the legislature” 
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(Baldwin, 2006: 297). To provide some substance to this point, Baldwin outlines that 
not all legislatures can be painted with the same brush due to differences, mainly, in- 
political factors such as whether policy or legislation is made by the executive or the 
legislature or whether the institutional design is presidential or parliamentary and 
electoral factors such as the electoral arrangement used in composing the 
legislature, and a host of other variables, has effects and plays itself out in relations 
between the executive and legislative arms of the state and how robustly the 
functions, namely, oversight, are carried out. Baldwin states the above outlined 
varying factors influences how the legislature behaves (2006: 299). Therefore, “[I]t is 
only by taking into account all such variable factors at any given time that one can 
assess the nature and status of the relationship between the legislature and the 
executive and determine whether it is the legislature or the executive that has the 
upper hand” (Baldwin, 2006: 300).  
It should be noted that Baldwin makes this argument in specific reference to the 
function of policy making. He uses three categories of executive-legislative relations 
in terms of the legislature’s capacity to influence policy. Policy making legislatures 
are stronger than the executive because the legislature itself proactively initiates 
policy (like the US Congress) while policy-influencing legislatures, legislatures with 
minimal or marginal policy effect and legislatures with no real policy effect, are 
overshadowed or dominated by the executive. These two last categories of 
legislatures vary between simply amending or rejecting executive policy (e.g. the 
British Parliament) or having no choice but to agree to executive policy (e.g. People’s 
Republic of China and North Korea) (Baldwin, 2006: 295 & 296).  
A point that Baldwin makes which I had not come across in reviewing the literature 
for this study and which may contribute towards explaining why executives seem to 
tilt the scales of power with legislatures, is that more and more, voters are turning to 
executives in presenting solutions to issues or challenges (Baldwin, 2006:301). 
However it is important to bear in mind that, especially as this dissertation moves on, 
relations and the balance of power between the executive and legislative institutions 
is a multifaceted one and concerns a myriad of variables. To elaborate using the 
Baldwin paper, the author argues that the executive-legislature relationship is 
influenced by variables such as whether institutional design is presidential or 
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parliamentary, the electoral system made use of, the unity and quality of the 
opposition and general party politics (2006: 299 & 300).  
Baldwin writes that the relationship is not plainly polarised where it could simply be 
said that one institution is more powerful than the other or holds the upper hand i.e. 
there is not “total insubordination” and the legislature is still able to influence actions 
(Baldwin, 2006: 301). Analysis of executive-legislative relations must then be 
informed by a discussion of such influencing variables as outlined above.  
The point could also be made that much of the literature reviewed here tends to 
focus on the committees of the United States Congress and those of the British 
Westminster Parliament, and to an extent, those committees of the Commonwealth, 
namely, Australia, who embody the Westminster character. This is attributed to that 
fact that the US Congress is characteristic of a presidential system and Westminster 
legislatures are typical of parliamentary systems. Another point elucidated is that the 
committee system of Congress is widely studied because it is so vastly different from 
the legislative committee systems of other countries. Furthermore “it should be 
emphasised…that the committee system in American Congress if not only the 
strongest system in the present study; it is by far the strongest” (Shaw, 1998: 227). 
The theory of the separation of powers is central to understanding parliamentary 
oversight. The theory has its roots in the postulation that there needs to be an 
effective separation of the three arms of state, namely, the executive, legislature and 
judiciary. Strictly speaking, the legislature creates legislation, the executive provides 
the means for legislation to be put into action and the judiciary puts the legislation 
into force (Calland, 1999: 8). This essentially means that there is a neat division 
between the three arms of state in terms of structure, function and authority. The 
theory is justified in the central tenant that ensures there is an even spread of power 
so that too much power is not located in one institution or arm of the state (Taljaard, 
Venter and Jolobe, 2011: 21).  
2.3 A Closer Look at Portfolio Committees 
Committees are one of the mechanisms through which the function of oversight is 
practically carried out. It has already been alluded to that this study will focus only on 
the committees of the National Assembly, otherwise known as portfolio committees. 
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These committees shadow government departments overseeing the activity of the 
portfolio department in a quintessential Westminster fashion for the tenure of a 
parliamentary term (five years). Mahiuddin outlines that this typically Westminster 
structure is made use of as it is intended to “reinforce parliamentary supervision over 
the executive” (Mahiuddin, 2009: 9). Essentially dividing the House into committees 
allows for specialised work to be conducted and allows for a narrower and more 
detailed space in which focused work is done than which the plenary can 
accommodate.  
Committees are guided by the Rules of Parliament, or in the case of this dissertation, 
the Rules of the National Assembly. The Rules, in part 10 (section 225) state that 
functionally, portfolio committees must deal with legislation and maintain oversight of 
the executive, organs of state and other bodies within its ambit, monitor, investigate 
and make recommendations in terms of the executive/entities within its ambit (Rules 
of the National Assembly, 2016: 141 & 142). Whereas the Constitutional framework 
sets the overall powers and provisions from which the National Assembly in its 
entirety can act, the Rules of the National Assembly colour and fill this constitutional 
framework by outlining the operations and procedures for committees. This 
framework constructs the institutional design in terms of how committees ought to 
function and be composed and provide an enabling environment for the exercise of 
legislative oversight. These provisions structure the various mechanisms for how 
oversight is practically conducted such as the scrutinising of departmental annual 
reports or calling a member of the executive to appear before the committee- these 
mechanisms are further discussed in the proceeding section.  
2.4 Tools for conducting oversight in the case of the South African 
Parliamentary Committee System  
As much as the Constitution provides for the powers through which the legislature 
conducts its oversight function, there are a number of clearly stipulated constitutional 
obligations on the executive and its departments to provide the legislature with the 
information necessary to execute this function effectively. This is outlined in section 
92 (3) (b) which states that “Members of Cabinet must provide Parliament with full 
and regular reports concerning matters under their control”. This effectively speaks 
to the importance of information in conducting optimal oversight – a variable this 
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study will discuss later on more comprehensively. One of the tools which the 
committee depends on in holding the department or entity accountable is through the 
annual report. According to a commissioned National Treasury research paper with 
the aim of improving the process for using annual reports as a key oversight tool, 
these annual reports provide committees with the capacity to assess the financial 
and non-financial performance of a department at the end of a financial year (2005: 
3). Annual reports are an instrument for committees to ascertain how a department 
performed, both financially and not, against targets and budgets set out in the 
Strategic Plan (National Treasury, 2005: 4) – another important document in the 
informational toolbox of committees for conducting oversight.  
The process is intended to be so that the committee would measure performance, as 
contained in the annual report, against objectives, as contained in the strategic 
plans, to make recommendations on the entire process in time for the department or 
entity to compile the coming year’s strategic plan and budget allocation (National 
Treasury, 2005: 4). Key provisions, obligations and, importantly, deadlines, in terms 
of this process, are comprehensively dealt with in the Public Finance Management 
Act (PFMA). 
The Act is clear on when annual reports and audited financial statements should be 
submitted to the legislature but in some respects the legislation could be stronger in 
terms of reports and statements not submitted on time. Section 65 (2) (a) of the 
PFMA outlines that a Minister who fails to table reports on time must table a written 
explanation in the legislature providing reasons why the report was not tabled on 
time (National Treasury, 2005: 6). Such a key piece of legislation is one that 
empowers committees in terms of oversight and so it must be argued that such 
legislation should be much stronger in punitive measures for the executive that 
effectively impedes accountability in such a way. It should however be qualified that 
tabling of annual reports and financial statements by the executive for the 
committees utilised in the sample of this study for the time frame under review was 
completed on time. The National Treasury Report notes that the level of compliance 
is not as high or consistent for public entities (National Treasury, 2005: 6).  
The National Treasury Report goes on to coherently outline ideal and practical 
means through which oversight should be carried out through a step by step 
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process. Points are made around the fact that efficient oversight depends on 
thorough preparation – it requires that the committee, both in terms of support staff 
and members, should know and understand what it is required to do, work according 
to strict timelines and undertake specific tasks such as carefully reading through 
reports, comparing performance against what was reported in the previous year and 
outlining which key aspects to scrutinise the department on when meeting with the 
officials and Minister (National Treasury, 2005: 28 – 30).  
Parliament also has at its disposal an Oversight and Accountability Model (Asserting 
Parliament’s Oversight Role for Enhancing Democracy) to fulfil the mandate of 
legislative oversight as a primary function of the institution. The model aims to: 
- provide the framework outlining how parliament conducts oversight; 
- streamline components;  
- enhance Parliament’s capacity to execute its oversight mandate; and 
- improve existing tools of legislative oversight (Oversight and Accountability 
Model, 2011: 5).  
In its aim to “provide the framework outlining how parliament conducts oversight”, the 
model outlines mechanisms at the disposal of parliament to conduct oversight such 
as interacting with civil society and other organisations in terms of departmental 
performance within its ambit, directly calling the executive/government to account in 
committee meetings, considering annual reports and strategic plans, posing 
questions in plenary sessions, conducting on site trips and calling for comments by 
the public (Oversight and Accountability Model, 2011: 17 & 18). While the Model 
speaks at length on the mandate of parliamentary committees, constitutional 
provisions to express the function of oversight and current mechanisms and tools for 
oversight, it also proposes how oversight could be strengthened. Namely, 
committees acting jointly on transversal issues, establishing an overarching 
oversight committee to synchronise the oversight work of portfolio committees and, 
in a similar vein, establishing an oversight and advisory section to assist in guiding, 
supporting and advising committees with their oversight function (2011: 31 & 32).  
The model goes further to comprehensively outline how committees could optimally 
use information provided by the executive, departments and entities, namely, annual 
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reports, quarterly reports, performance reports, financial statements etc to maintain 
oversight and ensure accountability. This would occur through ensuring members 
are adequately prepared even before the information is formally submitted, using the 
previous year’s documents for comparison, hosting public hearings for insight from 
others on the information submitted and then ensuring responses of the department 
are tracked for when the process commences the following year (Oversight and 
Accountability Model, 2011). Such a cycle would inculcate the legislature in terms of 
developing a “long-term view of oversight”, prevent the activity seen as a once-off 
and allow for the growth of building institutional memory (Oversight and 
Accountability Model, 2011). Such reform would need to be matched with 
committee/member support in terms of researchers, content advisers, library 
resources, admin support and meeting rooms, according to the Model. It would also 
include training to ensure members fully understand their institutional role in terms of 
oversight as well as practical training on I.T, budget analysis, policy analysis and 
methods of work – this training would also extend to research and support staff 
(Institutional and Accountability Model, 2011). The National Treasury Report also 
highlights that oversight depends on institutional memory in the sense that reviewing, 
scrutinising and generally working through essential information, should be 
conducted in a systematic way according to timelines each year so that there is a 
continuous cycle of oversight (National Treasury, 2011: 67). 
2.5 Comparative Research on Legislatures and Legislative Oversight  
Mahiuddin neatly summarised how legislatures, particularly the case of the mother 
British Parliament, were initially seen as the apex of the governance system during 
the 1800s or what was broadly identified as the “golden age” of the British 
Parliament (Mahiuddin, 2009: 5). The writings then of Lord Bryce began to question 
imbalances of power between the legislature and executive which eventually 
became known as the “decline of parliament” thesis – primarily this conclusion was 
reached due to law making powers becoming increasing vested with executives and 
no longer with parliament as well as the growth of pressure groups and political 
parties. It was concluded that where party politics was strong, legislators were driven 
by party interests and so the dominance of the executive pushed through, the 
legislature began to decline. Furthermore, “...party discipline dictates that the cabinet 
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is answerable not to the parliament but to the caucus of the majority party” 
(Mahiuddin, 2009: 6).  
Mahiuddin then goes on to show how, on the other hand, there were a number of 
legislative academics who did not support the decline of parliament thesis because 
they argued it was not substantiated by empirical data and that it could not be 
claimed that legislatures were waning in an unlimited manner (Mahiuddin, 2009: 7). 
This was based on the argument that evidence of the so-called “golden age of 
parliaments” did not exist empirically and that the spread of democratic theory in fact 
further strengthened the standing of legislatures (Mahiuddin, 2009: 8). Furthermore, 
as legislative activity progressed to include debates and specialised committees, it 
has “made the parliament a more effective body in terms of executive scrutiny than 
at any previous time this century” (Mahiuddin, 2009: 9).  
Mahiuddin interestingly examines and analyses the committee system of the 
Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad to identify the role of historical forces and factors in the 
evolution and development of the country’s committee system (Mahiuddin, 2009: 
34). Besides looking specifically at the Bangladesh case study, the paper lays a 
thorough framework for the discussion by presenting theories on parliamentary 
committee structures, its significance and the historical literature surrounding mostly 
Western legislative systems. The paper also usefully outlines broad factors, based 
on existing literature and theoretical assumptions, which arguably affect effective 
committee functioning in terms of:  
a) Political environment:  
- State structure: influence of the type of political system, namely, 
presidential or parliamentary, on carrying out of the oversight 
function by committees. As the literature review has shown, it is 
widely argued that oversight by legislative committees is not as 
strong in parliamentary systems as in presidential systems due to 
legislators belonging to the majority party holding back on criticism 
of the leaders of the party in their capacity as the executive  
- Political situation: wider environment in which parliament operates 
such as whether governance is authoritarian or democratic. It is 
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argued that under non-democratic regimes, legislatures hold no real 
power or influence on government action/decisions and opposition 
parties are almost unheard of. Furthermore, frequent changes to 
the political environment negatively affect legislative committees by 
working against continuity 
- Political parties: political parties are a chief variable in the 
discussion of legislative committee capacity – parties determine 
which of their members serve on which committee and factors such 
as the extent of party loyalty are a strong determinant on how the 
committee member carries out his/her legislative oversight. 
Dynamics between the members of the majority party on the 
committee and the opposition also influences the work of the 
committee especially when consensus is required. Mahiuddin 
highlights the “new institutionalists” who find that “committees are 
strongest when party control is weak”.  
- Interest groups; groupings with specific interests can influence 
committee decisions or action taken should they lobby members   
- Civil society: an active civil society that seeks to promote 
participation, transparency and accountability working closely with 
committees form part of enhancing legislative capacity of the 
committees 
- Media: the media play a role in disseminating information stemming 
from committee activity and making the decisions of committees 
known. This assists in fostering transparency. 
b) Committee structure:  
- Formal-legal framework: the fundamental basis of the mandate of 
the committee stem from where the committee obtains its formal 
power. This comes from the state’s constitution and procedural 
rules of the legislature. The paper argues that the formal legal 
framework from which committees draw its power outlines the 
mandate of the committees, the scope of committees and, 
essentially, identify powers the committee have in its arsenal 
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- Committee types: it is argued that permanent committees, which 
mirror government departments, have greater opportunities for 
influencing government policy and creating continuity in maintaining 
oversight than temporary, or ad hoc, committees  
- Committee selection process: allocation of members to committees 
is a central variable in analysing committee performance. The paper 
argues that in majoritarian systems, government dominates 
committee membership whereas in proportional representation 
systems, membership in committees reflects the ratio of parties 
represented in the legislature. This influences the relations between 
members on the committee with the view that the PR system allows 
for greater consensus and cooperation.    
c) Committee capacity: 
- Social standing of committee members: social backgrounds 
(occupational status, education, age and sex) and expertise 
(previous parliamentary experience, experience in public office and 
expertise on certain subject matters) of members can affect 
committee behaviour. It is argued that seniority, expertise and 
experience positively affect committee capacity  
- Staff and support services: sufficient resources and support to 
legislative committees are chief among the variables for effective 
committee capacity. Qualified staff and researchers greatly assist in 
keeping committee members clued-up and this promotes committee 
effectiveness through enabling active committee members   
Mahiuddin, using four ministerial standing committees as the sample (Committee on 
the Ministry of Finance, Committee on the Ministry of Planning, Standing Committee 
on the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Committee on the Ministry of Home Affairs), 
applies the above framework over a historical period of time to arrive at a number of 
findings relating specifically to the legislative and oversight functions of the 
committees.  
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Khmelko and Beers (2011) write interestingly of the Ukrainian Parliament, or Rada, 
on the views of MPs as to whether they view oversight conducted by committees as 
an expansion of partisan politics, a further platform for making the views of their 
constituents known or as a process independent of partisan considerations. 
Interestingly the authors find that partisan politics did not take the limelight in how 
MPs viewed committee oversight (Khmelko & Beers, 2011: 501). This adds fibre to 
the thread already forming in the literature review so far that what might seem 
obvious of parliamentarians and legislatures generally, is more often not the case or, 
to go back to the Barken paper, the “conventional wisdom” that legislatures are 
essentially rubber-stamps for ruling party policies, action and decisions (2005: 1). In 
other words, while it might seem the dominating thought would be that MPs are 
driven by partisan considerations when conducting oversight, this study in fact finds 
it is not the primary motivation. Khmelko and Beers (2011) reiterate this point by 
stating that “the findings of this study are significant, in part, because they offer an 
important challenge to recent accounts of Ukrainian politics, which tend to 
emphasise the highly partisan, politically polarised nature of Ukrainian democracy 
without acknowledging the on-going developments of both democratic institutions 
and political actors in the post-communist period” (Khmelko & Beers, 2011: 521). 
This paper was looked at by this dissertation as part of the comparative research 
and parliamentary oversight and legislative committee capacity.  
2.6 Testing Committee Effectiveness  
While not looking at the legislature as a whole or even specifically the legislative 
committee system, Volden and Wiseman investigate the effectiveness of US 
legislators in Congress (Volden & Wiseman, 2009: 4). The authors theorise that 
legislator effectiveness is comprised of (1) innate ability, (2) developing a critical skill 
set over time and (3) using these skills through the institutional framework of 
Congress to achieve results with an emphasis on legislative results or effectiveness 
(2009:5). Such literature could prove important for later discussion in this study 
particularly around the conceptualisation of political dynamics. Within the variable of 
political dynamics, the Volden and Wiseman paper could have particular relevance 
when looking at legislative committee capacity comprising members and, more so, 
chairpersons. This is highlighted when the authors state that “some (legislative) 
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positions are more valuable than others. Parties work hard to gain…committee 
chairmanships” (Volden & Wiseman, 2009: 21).  
Although there are various systems and methodologies through which they are 
conducted, there is a collective body of work looking at assessing the impact of 
legislative committees by scrutinising the extent to which recommendations in 
committee reports are taken up by governments. One such study was conducted by 
Benton and Russell (2012) looking at the select committees of the British House of 
Commons. As alluded to in the introduction to this study, broad assumptions are 
frequently made about the status of legislatures being weak, strong or a 
rubberstamp. These studies evaluating the extent to which report recommendations 
are implemented find that government does not disregard committee reports and 
their recommendations but in fact implement changes based on recommendations – 
a conclusion drawn by Benton and Russell (2012: 3). The comprehensive study by 
the authors covered a sample of seven select committees (i.e. those covering non-
legislative work, including oversight, as opposed to standing committees which only 
look at legislation) from 1997 to 2010 gathering all reports produced by the 
committees over this period specifically looking at recommendations made (Benton 
& Russell, 2012: 5-6). This paper is included in this literature review for the purposes 
of assessing how a committee system and its effectiveness was systematically 
studied and the factors identified in the analysis of committee influence over 
government action in the carrying out of the function of legislative oversight.   
Each recommendation was then coded against a number of variables. This 
quantitative data was supplemented by 56 semi-structured interviews with individuals 
participating in the work of the sample committees resulting in “the largest dataset 
ever gathered about the House of Commons select committees” (Benton & Russell, 
2012: 6-7). Not only did the study assess whether recommendations were accepted 
by government, as it is easy to simply say that, but also whether they were indeed 
put into effect. 
Broadly, both findings were that more recommendations than not were accepted and 
more recommendations than not were implemented. The authors find that this 
counters incorrect assumptions that committee reports are merely paid lip-service to 
by government but that they in fact are treated seriously both in terms of acceptance 
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and implementation for both minor recommendations and those requiring greater 
change, in the case of the British House of Commons (2012: 11). 
Interestingly, the variables associated with the committee itself were the style and 
reputation of the committee, the nature and culture of the department it oversees, the 
personality and effectiveness of the chairperson and the drafting style of the 
committee clerks (Benton & Russell, 2012: 11). The authors acknowledge that such 
studies may over or underestimate the influence of the committee because there are 
various other activities behind the scenes which could also have an effect on report 
recommendations being accepted and implemented and then went on to identify 
potential influencing factors supplemented by qualitative information from interviews 
(Benton & Russell, 2012: 15-17). 
The Benton and Russell paper fundamentally confronts the notion or assumption that 
committee outcomes, in the form of reports, do not hold significant weight or are 
taken seriously by the executive and government proving that more report 
recommendations than not are implemented and put into effect even those reports 
recommending major policy change (Benton & Russell, 2012: 1). The entire process 
and practice is crucial to the legislative function of oversight (Benton & Russell, 
2012: 22). 
David Monk, in developing a framework for testing the effectiveness of parliamentary 
committees, finds that the body of research attempting to assess committee systems 
are limited to: 
a) Studying the effect of committees on public policy including the attitude 
of governments and related public debate. Here researchers use case 
studies, observation and key interviews as opposed to quantitative 
data. 
b) Studying the implementation of committee recommendations as a 
measure of committee system effectiveness. Here, data collected is 
used to aggregate averages. 
c) Studies focusing more on quantitative data by allowing “the data to 
guide the research process and their conclusions” in terms of 
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assessing potential gaps between common assumptions and 
perceptions and the reality on the ground (Monk, 2009: 1). 
In further explaining the development of his committee system effectiveness 
framework, Monk elaborates on how performance is measured through inputs, 
usually staff hours or money spent against outputs i.e. what the committee is 
supposed to do or achieve in order to develop findings of effectiveness or “the 
essence of what success means for an agency” (Monk, 2009: 3). 
Monk (2009) acknowledges that there are various subjective nuances which studies 
based on quantitative data solely cannot explain. He writes that there are various 
political dimensions to the work of committees and the decisions they reach which 
have a significant role to play, as an indicator, in articulating why some committee 
reports and recommendations are more successful than others. While this 
dissertation looked at the variables used by both Benton and Russell (2012) and 
Monk (2009) in terms of whether they could be used as part of studying committee 
capacity in the South African parliament, it was found the variables used by these 
authors best suited their individual framework and methodology and not necessarily 
the methodology and aims of this dissertation. Nevertheless, the papers by the 
authors were useful for the review of literature and existing studies in preparation of 
this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER THREE: FINDINGS 
An Analysis of “Hard/Physical” Variables in the Discussion of Committee 
Capacity in the South African National Assembly 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings related to the fieldwork conducted 
for this study. To recap the methodology utilised, the findings stem from practical 
interviews anonymously conducted with committee chairpersons and staff, 
researchers and content advisers, for purposes of gaining a first-hand account of the 
complexities of structural and tangible variables in forming a vital part of the 
institutional capacity at the disposal of committees. Broadly these structural variables 
comprising capacity are conceptualised as the tools of the trade that enable 
committees to carry out its oversight functions optimally. Here we are specifically 
looking at what the committees can, have the ability or are able to do in terms of 
executing the oversight function. Arter usefully frames legislative capacity as the 
potential the committee possess to carry out its salient functions or influence 
government/executive action (Arter, 2007: 249).  
The chapter will be constructed in such a way so as to broadly categorise the 
findings according to themes as well as to compare and contrast these direct 
findings with what the existing literature and body of research assumes. Overall the 
assumption is that the limits in which committees can conduct its oversight function 
is reliant on a number of dynamics and this chapter will be discussing the dynamics 
related to hard resources or those of a physical nature (Mahiuddin, 2009: 13).  
3.1 PHYSICAL RESOURCES  
The chairpersons interviewed were asked if they were of the opinion that the 
committees over which they presided had a sufficient amount of physical resources 
overall to conduct its oversight function. Physical resources here are conceptualised 
as hard, tangible and practical mechanisms which committees require to perform 
optimally, particularly, sufficient physical office space to meet, budget and other 
resources relating to printers, computers, technology to relay presentations to the 
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committee members etc. Three out of five of the chairpersons interviewed were of 
the opinion that there were sufficient resources for their committees to conduct its 
oversight function. Two of the chairpersons significantly pointed out that the South 
African parliament, and specifically the committee section, did not always have the 
sufficient resources but had acquired and created the necessary physical resource 
capacity as the years went on. Sufficient resources were not always at hand 
because of smaller budgets and the fact that there were fewer committees. As the 
number of committees grew and the budget of parliament increased incrementally, 
more resources were acquired to meet the needs of the growing committee section.  
3.1.1. Legislative Library  
The chairpersons were also asked to rank various resources as to whether they 
were deemed to be very important, moderately important or not that important. 
Parliament has a very extensive legislative library for members to make use of yet 
three of the chairpersons interviewed ranked it as only a moderately important 
resource while one chairperson felt it was not that important at all. My personal 
observation is that the library is more for individual members to acquire more 
knowledge on a particular matter or to conduct additional research but it is not a 
resource which aims to serve the capacity of the committee as a whole. Perhaps 
chairpersons perceive that any information they require is provided by the committee 
secretariat and so there would be no reason to conduct further research on any 
given area. It could also be that should Members wish to delve further into a matter 
of interest, they solicit the help of their political party researchers instead of the 
legislative library directly. This however was not confirmed through an interview 
question but instead a deduction made from the way in which the chairpersons 
ranked the importance of the resource.  
The 2014 Parliament Budget Speech3 by the Speaker of the National Assembly also 
points to the underutilisation of the legislative library without delving into the reasons 
for this evident underuse. The Speaker, in the speech, pushes Members of 
Parliament to make use of the library “to learn more about the advantages of the new 
                                                 
3 Fourth Parliament Budget Vote (2014) Retrieved 10 June 2015, From: 
www.parliament.gov.za/live/contentpopup.php?Item_ID=3587&Category_ID=  
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system. There are simply no more excuses”. The speech highlights the upgrade of 
the library and “digital content delivery application”4.  
3.1.2. Physical Infrastructure  
When chairpersons were asked to rank the variations in importance of physical 
infrastructure, what the study conceptualised of this specific variable was in terms of 
the sufficient space in which to conduct meetings, sufficient computers, printers and 
other technology which forms part of the capacity of committees to generate reports, 
documentation and the like. Interestingly, only one5 of the chairpersons to whom the 
question was posed viewed this as an important variable in playing its role as part of 
the resource capacity of committees while the other chairpersons viewed it only as 
moderately important. Thinking of these findings further, the Parliament of South 
Africa does indeed have all the trimmings of what one might assume of a modern 
day legislature. Most of the venues in which committees operate are spacious, 
obviously depending on the size of the delegation expected for a particular meeting, 
the venues are maintained, and there is air-conditioning and microphones to hear 
those speaking adequately and to formally record all inputs. Furthermore, the venues 
have technology on which to present inputs (projectors), electrical end-points for 
connecting laptops etc. and some even have cameras to televise proceedings live 
onto the parliamentary channel. Based on my observations, while some of the 
venues are older than others in look and style, there is sufficient physical resource 
capacity for committees to conduct their work. However, perhaps, when it really 
comes down to the essentials, it might be that the vital physical capacity is simply 
that the committee has the means to produce the documentation it requires to 
operate and of course a meeting space for all to come together. This was however 
not directly alluded to by any of the chairpersons interviewed but could be a plausible 
account for this specific finding.  
3.1.3. Civil Society Organisations and Academia  
Committees at times interact with civil society organisations and academics so this 
was included in the options of which to rank the importance, or non-importance of 
                                                 
4 Fourth Parliament Budget Vote (2014) Retrieved 10 June 2015, From: 
www.parliament.gov.za/live/contentpopup.php?Item_ID=3587&Category_ID= 
5 Interview 1: 5 March 2015, Parliament of South Africa  
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hard resources. The organisations often provide information to the committee when 
there is a particular topical discussion on the agenda or to brief the committee before 
the department or entities presents their annual performance plans, strategic plans, 
quarterly reports, annual reports or budgets. It is essential to qualify that I have 
observed that some committees have a longer standing relationship with certain civil 
society organisations or academics which for many years have been involved in the 
relevant policy sector compared to other committees where the relations between 
the organisations and committees are not as close. This would impact how the 
chairperson interviewed would respond on the interaction or research received by 
the civil society organisations or academics. By this I mean with the committees with 
longer standing relations with civil society organisations, the chairperson was more 
likely to rate civil society organisations as an important resource. This indeed was 
the outcome in the interviews conducted – the chairpersons of committees with 
stronger ties to civil society did indeed rate it as a resource which was more 
important than not important. This is further supported by the interviews conducted 
with the content advisers – the content advisers from the committees which had 
longer standing relationships with civil society organisations indicated positively that 
their committees did often solicit research from civil society or academia.  
Taking the correctional services committee for example, in the committee legacy 
report, special mention was made of the fact that the committee established close 
working relations with research, NGO and academic institutions along with labour 
organisations. These civil society groupings regularly commented on matters relating 
to the department of correctional services and general matters pertaining to the 
correctional services environment. The report goes on further to say the committee 
found the interactions useful because it allowed for a “broad spectrum of 
commentators” which also served to supplement internal committee research. The 
police committee also made special mention of the fact that in the method of work of 
the committee, it involved many partners in civil society and academics to present 
evidence in preparation for engaging with the department and/or entities usually 
before hearings on the annual reports and budget. The legacy report of the police 
committee then went on to outline a comprehensive list of civil society organisations 
and academic institutions the committee regularly engaged with. Similarly, the social 
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development committee also highlighted that one of the objectives of the committee 
was to forge relations with civil society in the social development arena6.  
Only one of the chairpersons answered that this was an important resource7 while 
the other chairpersons indicated that it was a resource which was not that important. 
This could point to the fact that this sub-variable could be considered an important 
resource to the committee in some cases where their input is drawn into committee 
oversight deliberations while in other cases, the committee could consider civil 
society input as less significant when it comes to oversight.  
3.1.4. Committee Budget 
When asked to rank this vital component of the resource capacity of committees, all 
the chairpersons interviewed deemed it a very important variable. This does seem to 
be the obvious assumption to make because on a very basic level, most, if not all, 
systems conducting operations require a sufficient budget in order to function. One 
of the chairpersons highlighted the fact that there was not so much a problem of a 
lack budget but rather that, at times, funds were not spent or adequately deployed in 
the areas they were required. The chairperson said that it might be that chairpersons 
were provided with TVs in their offices as opposed to spending money on acquiring a 
researcher for that chairperson – “(I don’t think it’s) a money problem – it was how 
we use the money”8.  
Each committee is provided with a standard or uniform budget distributed equitably 
across the board. According to a content adviser surveyed, additional allocations 
were made to committees who were particularly busy or had particularly high 
workloads9. An example would be if a committee was holding public hearings across 
a number of provinces (perhaps on a pending piece of legislation) then additional 
funds would be allocated, over and above the initial standard allocation, to facilitate 
the public participation process as one of the primary functions of the legislature, and 
by extension, the committee.  
                                                 
6 Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Social Development, 2014, page 3 
7 Interview 2: 18 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
8 Interview 1: 5 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
9 Interview 8: 10 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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In the legacy report of the communications committee, reference was made to the 
fact that its budget allocation needed to be reviewed “in light of its workload”. The 
report elaborated to note that the committee’s activities required more budget than 
the committee was allocated. The report said that in future, thought should be given 
to allocating committee budgets as the national budget was i.e. taking in 
consideration the scope of the department, its personnel and services provided etc. 
This implied that the process of allocating committee budgets uniformly was 
ineffective. The Legacy Report of the Communications Committee noted that its 
budget was exceeded by the third quarter of each financial year for the duration of 
the Fourth Parliament10.  
This is a significant finding as it speaks to the fact that committee budgets are not 
drawn up according to the scope of a department’s work which will invariably vary 
widely across departments. Departments themselves vary greatly whether this be in 
terms of staff complement, the number of entities reporting to the Minister or whether 
it is a service-delivery orientated department or not. These differences help in 
explaining why budget allocations differ between departments. One could argue that 
since committees themselves vary in their scope of oversight, budgets should be 
differentiated among the committees as they are among the departments 
themselves. Having a uniform budget effectively means that those committees with 
demanding workloads overseeing large departments and a vast number of entities, 
struggle to manage its budget according to this wide scope while another committee, 
with less of a demanding workload for instance, could end up with a surplus of funds.  
A key aspect of an institutionalised legislature is one which has autonomy and, 
specifically, autonomy over its budget – this autonomy is an integral part of an 
independent legislature. The fundamental importance of a budget is easily thought of 
as the one structural or physical capacity indicator upon which almost all other 
structural indicators depend- without an adequate budget there would simply be no 
funds to pay a host of sufficiently qualified staff, procure the technical equipment 
needed or simply maintain the resources committees already have.  
                                                 
10 Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Communications. 2014. Page 53 & 59  
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3.1.5. Human Resources: Committee Staff 
Chairpersons in the sample were asked to rank the importance of the staff working 
for the committee both in terms of administrative staff (secretaries, document officers 
and assistants) and research staff (researchers and content advisers). All the 
surveyed chairpersons found this structural variable to be a “very important” one 
both for administrative and research staff. Without a doubt this finding proves that 
committee staff are a crucial aspect of the structural capacity of committees.  
Two chairpersons interviewed made reference to the fact that, like physical 
resources, parliament had few staff working for an individual committee specifically 
but over the years this capacity had increased. One chairperson went on further to 
elaborate that when she started off as a chair of the committee, there was one 
committee secretary and a researcher who served also as a researcher for various 
other committees. Six years later, her committee now has two secretaries, a 
dedicated researcher and content adviser and an assistant to deal with printing and 
logistics – this was a total of five dedicated committee staff members as opposed to 
only one dedicated staff member six years prior11. It is also worth mentioning that 
each chairperson has a dedicated executive, or personal, secretary to run the diary 
of that chairperson. One could argue that such a post further adds to the staff 
capacity of committees albeit in a less direct way than the staff that work for the 
committees solely. Another chairperson added that when he first came to parliament, 
there was no such post as content adviser or dedicated researcher/s but over time 
that capacity had been created for committees to function more effectively12. This is 
further supported by the one researcher interviewed who said that when committees 
were functioning on a very minimal human resource capacity, the staff employed 
were horribly overworked and committees were understaffed13. 
3.2 Resource Sufficiency  
Of the seven committees which comprise the sample utilised in this study, all seven 
had the full complement of human resources meaning each portfolio committee had 
a secretary, document officer/assistant, researcher and content adviser. It should be 
                                                 
11 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
12 Interview 2: 18 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
13 Interview 9: 12 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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noted one committee had two secretaries and another committee had two 
researchers due to their increased workload. Furthermore, each chairperson had an 
executive personal secretary but as this position is not directly linked to the 
functioning of the committee, it is not included in the below table:  
Committee Content 
Adviser 
Researcher Committee 
Secretary 
Assistant/document 
officer 
Communication 1 1 1 1 
Correctional 
Services 
1 1 1 1 
Energy 1 1 1 1 
Police 1 2 1 1 
Social 
Development 
1 1 1 1 
Trade and Industry 1 1 2 1 
Water and 
Environmental 
Affairs 
1 1 1 1 
 
In surveying research staff of committees, it is evident that there is not a clear cut 
sum of resource capacity which one could pinpoint as being sufficient. Two content 
advisers and the researcher interviewed indicated that what could be deemed a 
sufficient amount of resources varies depending on the committee in question. 
Similarly to the ineffective system of uniform budgets, unvaryingly allocating 
committee staff could be argued to be just an ineffective. A uniform allocation of staff 
does not take into account the varying scope of committees and this makes for 
inefficient operation. Those committees overseeing big departments and a large 
number of entities simply have to make do with what is available to them.  
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The one researcher interviewed stated that some committees are incredibly busy 
while others are not so much14. This is certainly what the literature and existing 
research concludes as well. Not only is each parliament distinct but each committee 
is in itself distinct – each committee oversees a different department and a varying 
number of entities. Simply looking at the sample utilised by this study, these varying 
distinctions are clear. Taking for example the number of entities the committee 
oversees, the portfolio committee on water and environment affairs, which in fact 
oversees two government departments, oversees a combined total of 21 
environment and water-sector entities. In its Legacy Report, the Portfolio Committee 
on Water and Environmental Affairs outlined that with the Committee essentially 
overseeing two departments, its work load was doubled – whereas other committees 
would scrutinise one annual report, strategic report and one budget, the Committee 
on Water and Environmental Affairs was scrutinising two sets. This was in addition to 
overseeing over 20 entities all within the same timeframe in which to complete the 
work. The report added that the “public demand on these two large departments in 
terms of service delivery is woefully huge and complex”15.  
Another example is the portfolio committee on trade and industry which oversees 14 
entities. This is in contrast to a portfolio committee such as social development which 
oversees two entities while the rest of the committees in the sample oversee various 
amounts along the spectrum16. This is indeed why the study aimed to utilise as 
representative a sample as possible to highlight variations among portfolio 
committees. Despite these differences, as one of the content advisers surveyed 
pointed out, the more resource capacity a committee has, the more it would be able 
to do17.  
Earlier, under the committee budget subparagraph, it was pointed out that 
committees are allocated uniform budgets with additional allocations provided as the 
need arises. Perhaps budget allocation, as a key component of the resource 
indicator, should acknowledge these variances in committee workload for allocation 
to take place on an individual committee basis as opposed to the across the board 
fashion. One of the content advisers surveyed also indicated that a uniform approach 
                                                 
14 Interview 9: 12 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
15 Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs. 2014.  
16 See Addendum 1 and 4 for the complete number of entities overseen per committee in the sample 
17 Interview 8: 10 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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to budget allocation might not be the best option simply because of varying 
workloads – one committee might use its entire budget because it is that busy while 
another committee might only use a percentage of its budget18. These points thus far 
find that committees are not resourced according to the scope of oversight i.e. the 
size of the department overseen, the complexity of the sector portfolio or the number 
of entities within the committee’s ambit.  
If this point could be made for the budget then this study argues it could be made for 
the staff complement as well. It has already been stated that one of the committees 
in the sample, trade and industry, has two committee secretaries because of a high 
workload, while the other committees only have one. In the sample, all the 
committees only have one researcher and one content adviser except for the police 
committee who have two researchers because of increased workload due to the 
large size of the department it oversees. Surely for those committees which have an 
increased workload, more entities to oversee and bigger departments to hold 
accountable, this complement of staff should be increased or at least for it to be 
considered on an individual committee basis as opposed to uniformly. As one 
content adviser outlined, the uniform approach in terms of committee research 
support and budget allocations, might not be the best option19. The suggestion is that 
these allocations should be made based on the strategic plans of each committee 
which would provide an indication of what the committee aims to achieve and work 
through for the five-year term.  
Although a committee might oversee only a handful of entities, for example the 
portfolio committee of police which oversees three entities, the committee, however, 
oversees a very big department – the police department has a staff complement of 
197 946 members and a budget allocation of R67 917 billion, based on 2013/14 
National Treasury information20. This would certainly explain why a content adviser 
would attest that for some committees, there could never be enough research 
capacity – there are various and specific areas over which the committee must 
maintain oversight and where great research depth is needed. It can therefore be 
argued that having two researchers and one content adviser for such a committee is 
                                                 
18 Interview 9: 12 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
19 Ibid 
20 See Addendum 1 for the full complement of departmental budgets, staff complement and entities 
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not sufficient. Although this is one researcher more than other committees in the 
sample, it could still be argued this capacity is not nearly sufficient given the large 
scope of oversight of the committee.  
A content adviser indicated that not only should the research capacity of very busy 
committees be increased but so should the secretariat capacity because an 
increased workload equates to meetings being held more frequently21. However the 
research complement and secretarial complement of committees work together to 
form the human resource capacity and both sides provide essential support to the 
committee in conducting its oversight mandate. The number of meetings a 
committee might hold is a strong indication of the workload of that committee. 
Looking at the sample of committees used in this paper, committees differed in the 
amount of meetings held in the year under review – the social development 
committee held the least amount of meetings (21) while other committees met an 
average of 40 times. The committee on trade and industry, however, held a 
whopping 74 meetings for the year under review. It could strongly be argued that 
such considerations should account for how resources are allocated to committees 
but this dissertation has come to show this is not the case.  
One of the content advisers explained that when a committee is extraordinarily busy 
with a special hearing meeting or on an oversight visit, the committee is able to 
request for additional assistance from another committee assistant in this particular 
instance22. Although this would be useful, it could be argued that it is best for such 
additional capacity to be permanent instead of on an ad hoc basis.  
3.3 Resource Asymmetries  
In the literature review of this study, when discussing the institutional capacity of the 
legislature particularly in terms of fulfilling the function of oversight, it is widely 
assumed, and repeated reference was made, to the resource inequality or imbalance 
between the legislature and the executive. This assumption can be argued to be true 
in the case of the South African National Assembly legislative committee system. 
Three of the chairpersons interviewed, mentioned the fact the executive has access 
                                                 
21 Interview 6: 10 November 2014, Email Correspondence  
22 Interview 6: 10 November 2014, Email Correspondence  
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to a vast amount of experts, both inside and outside the department. In addition to 
access, the department has the time to engage these experts whether it is in 
preparation for certain special hearings, policy papers or preparing for legislation to 
come before the committee. A typical department has complete branches dedicated 
to legislation and legal services while the committee, to which it is accountable, only 
has a handful of staff to prepare members. One chairperson highlighted that 
committees do not have the ease of access to such experts as a department would 
nor enough time to process policies or legislation23.  
One chairperson pinpointed this imbalance of resources, and effectively power, 
between the legislative and executive branches to the executive having access to 
more resources24. This asymmetry of resources between the executive and the 
legislature applies to all areas of structural resources. It could then be argued that 
the legislature has the theoretical power of oversight and accountability, embodied 
through the Constitution and Rules of Parliament, yet in terms of structural capacity 
to physically wield this power, the legislature falls short in comparison.   
Another instance of how this resource imbalance could be conceptualised is thinking 
about the inequalities of time between the legislature and the executive. It has been 
noted that committees often have a limited amount of time to balance varying tasks 
while at the same time Members have individual commitments in plenary, party 
business and constituencies. Members of the executive, on the other hand, do not 
face these pressures of time or at least have a host of staff to alleviate the balancing 
of various tasks. One chairperson made reference to this when she highlighted her 
lack of time was part of insufficient resources – she only had one executive secretary 
even though she was expected to address a variety of issues25. This is in stark 
contrast to a member of the executive who would have a host of personal staff.  
The issue of time was again raised in a civil society conference paper on South 
Africa’s Legislatures (2012 Report of Proceedings and Issues at the People’s Power 
Conference) where, in discussing oversight and accountability, it was noted that 
committees deal with an array of complex and intricate information in relation to 
                                                 
23 Interview 4: 26 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
24 Ibid  
25 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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carrying out its oversight function whether it be in the form of departmental or entity 
reports, budgets or plans. For these to be dealt with sufficiently, the committee does 
not only need the necessary structural or resource capacity, specifically in the form 
of its researchers, but both researchers and Members require time to consider all the 
information (People’s Power, People’s Parliament, 2012: 43). The paper argued the 
point further by noting that a typical department would mull over its annual budget 
with National Treasury for months while on the other hand, committees only had a 
few weeks to review the budgets of its departments and entities (People’s Power, 
People’s Parliament, 2012: 44).  
The resource asymmetry between the legislature and executive was also outlined by 
one of the chairperson’s interviewed who spoke to the variances specifically in light 
of human resource imbalances. It has already been stated that the committees in the 
sample only had one or two researchers, one content adviser, one or two secretaries 
and an assistant which comprised the staff ensuring everything related to the 
committee was on track and its mandate was being met. The chairperson said this 
was vastly different to the average department who would have a staff complement 
in the thousands working in many specialised divisions. Simply put, he said, the 
committee had no “one up” on this capacity26.  
The same chairperson also highlighted a pertinent point where, because of this 
glaring resource capacity inequality between the legislature and executive, 
committees often have no choice but to simply rely on the information provided to 
them by entities or the department because there is no time or human resource 
capacity for the committee to “look beyond what the department presented or 
provided”27.  
This might be conceptualised as information asymmetry between the legislature and 
executive where the latter provided committees with hordes of information and data 
while the committee did not have the capacity to match to develop its own sources of 
information or data. The chairperson saw this as a concern because “the committee 
could not only rely on what the department said”28. He found this was particularly so 
                                                 
26 Interview 5: 9 June 2015, Parliament of SA  
27 Ibid 
28 Interview 5: 9 June 2015, Parliament of SA  
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in terms of research capacity of the committees where the only way to work towards 
evening out this particular resource imbalance with the executive, was for 
committees to build teams or armies of researchers instead of one or two who were 
to be knowledgeable in all areas of work of the department29.  
The point that “the committee could not only rely on what the department said”, 
raises interesting questions about the relationship between committees and civil 
society. Ideally, civil society should augment committee capacity in critically 
analysing information or perhaps as a mechanism through which departmental 
information could be assessed. However earlier in the chapter, the study established 
that three of the five chairpersons interviewed, attached moderate levels of 
importance to civil society as a committee resource. It should be a point for 
committees to review relations with civil society organisations to augment their 
capacity particularly in terms of analysing departmental information. It should be 
pointed out that some of the chairpersons interviewed were new to the position 
following the beginning of the Fifth Parliament. It could be that operations simply 
followed from what was maintained during the previous committee (i.e. from the 
Fourth Parliament). This meant that if the previous committee did not have close 
relations with civil society in the sector, the new committee would simply maintain 
that status quo. Perhaps the new chairpersons still required time to familiarise 
themselves with civil society in the sector and possibly develop a relationship over 
time. Such considerations would influence the perception of the chairperson as to 
whether civil society input was important or not as a resource.  
3.4 Factors impeding legislative oversight 
Chairpersons surveyed were asked, based on their experiences and opinions, about 
the aspects they viewed as some of the largest impediments to conducting effective 
oversight over executive bodies, whether this be the department or entities. Many of 
the chairpersons raised the issue of resources or the fact that there could be more 
structural resources, especially in terms of human resources, as one such 
impediment. 
                                                 
29 Ibid  
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A chairperson also raised the point that a great deal of oversight work is cross-
cutting in nature but parliament lacked a structure for committees to easily work in a 
transversal fashion or in a clustered way to consider issues which would arch over a 
number of committees30. The chairperson found that committees operated in too 
great of a silo-like fashion when there are many issues which needed joint-
consideration31. There are means for two or more committees to meet jointly but, 
based on my observation, such meetings require a great deal of planning in order to 
coordinate the staff, Members and agendas of the committees added to which there 
are a number of logistical issues. Mention has also previously been made of the fact 
that some committees are simply busier in terms of workload than others and 
committee staff would compile committee programmes months in advance to ensure 
the committee has enough time to get through its workload. Nevertheless, cross-
cutting oversight work is pertinent and recommendations in this area would be 
important to look into. 
Another chairperson made reference to the fact that, as information was central to 
legislative oversight, a lack of data or data that was not easily available is an 
impediment to effective oversight32. This itself adds to the fact that the findings 
alluded to in the previous discussion on information asymmetries, is considerably 
important to committees successfully executing its oversight function. 
In the same way as information imbalances are found to be a large impediment to 
oversight as referenced by an interviewed chairperson, another chairperson made 
reference to the fact that lack of time, especially when compared to the executive, 
impedes the capacity of the committee to undertake effective oversight33. The 
chairperson said that the time allocated to get through certain tasks related to 
oversight was simply inadequate to allow for sufficient preparation. She made note of 
the fact that her committee oversaw a variety of very technical entities besides the 
large department itself. Experience had taught her that it was simply impossible for 
everything to be covered in terms of oversight but the committee had developed the 
skill of ring-fencing key areas to laser in on. She alluded to the fact that perhaps the 
“secret” to oversight and accountability meant effective prioritisation of the 
                                                 
30 Interview 5: 9 June 2015, Parliament of SA  
31 Interview 5: 9 June 2015, Parliament of SA  
32 Interview 2: 18 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
33 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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committee’s tasks because one “cannot exercise oversight over everything – you 
simply can’t”34. 
 
                                                 
34 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
An Analysis of “Soft/Political” Dynamics in the Discussion of Committee 
Capacity in the South African National Assembly 
This chapter will present and discuss the findings related to the fieldwork conducted 
for this study. To recap on the methodology utilised, the findings stem from 
interviews anonymously conducted with committee chairpersons and staff, namely, 
researchers and content advisers, for purposes of gaining a first-hand account of 
understanding the complexities of political variables and dynamics in forming a vital 
part of the institutional capacity at the disposal of committees. Broadly these political 
variables comprising capacity are conceptualised as the political will and political 
autonomy to enable committees to carry out its oversight functions optimally. Here 
variables or dynamics are intangible, “soft” and not as straightforward when 
compared to the discussion on structural capacity variables.  
Overall the assumption is that the limits in which committees can conduct its 
oversight function is reliant on a number of dynamics. This chapter will be discussing 
the dynamics which are political in nature and arguably issues relating to governance 
and partisan politics which may manifest themselves in the legislative committee 
system and so play an important part in the conceptualisation of “soft” capacity.  
4.1 Committee Membership: Chairpersons and Members 
This dissertation argues that committee chairpersons and its members could be 
considered as primary elements of the political capacity committees enjoy. 
Essentially the rationale is that chairpersons and members are party-political 
individuals having achieved parliamentary seats and positions through internal party 
lists – a defining feature of the proportional representation electoral system South 
Africa makes use of. The committee support staff were conceptualised as forming 
part of the structural or hard resource capacity in the previous chapter. It could then 
be put that committee chairpersons and members form part of the political capacity 
committees require to operate efficiently.  
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4.1.1. Education and Experience 
Bearing in mind that only chairpersons of the committees in the sample utilised by 
the study were interviewed, a picture developed of the educational and professional 
background of the chairpersons. The thinking that follows is that a committee 
requires chairpersonship and general membership that is arguably well qualified and 
skilled, particularly in the sector in which the committee is based. Of the 
chairpersons interviewed, all except one, had a university-level of education. One of 
the chairpersons had a Bachelor of Commerce degree while the other chairpersons 
had Masters Degrees in varying fields. While the survey did not delve deeper into the 
field in which the degrees were based, the fact that more than the majority of 
chairpersons in the sample bring to the position basic skills and knowledge acquired 
at university level is an advantage.  
An interesting comparative snapshot was provided in the Perspectives Paper on 
African legislatures and the advance of democracy of the percentages of MPs with 
university degrees. Surprisingly, South Africa was exceeded by a number of other 
African legislatures and the country was only slightly above the median percentage 
with 68% of MPs having a university degree (2012: 6). During the 2014 budget vote 
speech of Parliament, the Speaker of the National Assembly did allude to the fact 
that Parliament did have an agreement with the Public Administration Leadership 
and Management Authority (PALAMA) to provide training to members. In April 2014, 
the Speaker outlined that 225 members of Parliament, and the provincial 
legislatures, achieved advanced certificates in Governance and Leadership at Wits 
University through this agreement35.  
It could be the case that chairpersons might not have the educational qualification to 
match the work of the committee it chairs but may have working experience in the 
sector of the committee. For the chairpersons surveyed as per the committee 
sample, this was however not the case. Before entering the National Assembly, 
chairpersons worked primarily as lawyers and lecturers. Again the interview did not 
delve into the details about the positions chairpersons occupied before elected to 
Parliament. However, it could be argued that having experience in the positions 
                                                 
35 Fourth Parliament Budget Vote (2014) Retrieved 10 June 2015, From: 
www.parliament.gov.za/live/contentpopup.php?Item_ID=3587&Category_ID= 
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outlined above, provide skills which would assist in committee work but the point is 
that this is a less direct application of experience to committees.  
In much of the literature reviewed, positive correlations were drawn between the 
number of years individuals had formed part of the membership of legislative 
committees and, specifically in terms of chairing, the number of years fulfilling the 
position of chairperson and increased effectiveness of committees. Of the 
chairpersons surveyed, a collective picture was painted of chairpersons who had 
years of experience in the National Assembly with two chairpersons even forming 
part of the first crop of MPs in 1994. This forms a great part of the institutional 
memory vital to the discussion of legislative committee capacity. Collectively, 
between the chairpersons surveyed, there is combined legislative experience of 
almost 70 years and 40 years specifically chairing legislative committees. In more 
definite terms, none of the chairpersons sampled had less than 10 years experience 
in the national legislature while others began their legislative careers in provincial 
legislatures.  
4.1.2. Political Environment 
Chairpersons interviewed were asked if they had ever served or worked in local, 
provincial government or national government either in an elected position or in an 
administrative role. The question was posed to get a sense of perhaps how close 
ties were between the chairperson and party. Of the chairpersons surveyed, one was 
a former Deputy Minister, one held a senior position working for the ANC itself 
nationally, one was a Deputy Chairperson of an ANC Gauteng region and another 
was a member of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. The remaining chairperson 
served in national government in an administrative role.  
A cogent line of thinking is that if chairpersons seemed to be working closely in 
political party matters or even hold senior positions in the party, then that 
chairperson would spend a considerable amount of time on party-related activities. 
This however does not seem to be the case when chairpersons were probed about 
the amount of time they spent on activities attributed to what would assumed to be 
usual for a chairperson to engage. Namely, committee work, plenary work, 
constituency work and party work outside of the constituency. As echoed in the 
65 
 
previous chapter, the chairpersons interviewed unanimously responded that most of 
their time was consumed by committee work. This was even more significant in that 
the amount of time spent on committee activity was above 50%. Party work was in 
fact rated as the activity the surveyed chairpersons spent the least amount of time 
on. Although more research and work could go into the relationship between time 
spent on party-related activity and seniority in the party, at a superficial level, this 
finding reveals that close relations with the political party or occupying seniority in the 
party does not mean committee work is neglected or does not come first to 
committee chairpersons, at least for those interviewed.  
This is further supported by the fact that, amongst the interviewed chairpersons, not 
much use was made of party - political researchers. When chairpersons were asked 
to rate the importance of party research staff as “very important”, “moderately 
important” or “not that important”, findings varied between “not that important” and 
“moderately important” with only one chairperson in the survey finding the resource 
was “very important”36. Taking then the median of the responses, inferences could 
be drawn that party political research is not important to the work of committees or 
as an aspect of political capacity. This could further be substantiated by the fact that 
chairpersons did not raise the variable as an important or lacking resource in the 
qualitative findings either. It could be argued that the low level of importance 
attached to party researchers is that committee members and chairpersons find the 
information provided by the committee secretariat sufficient to serve their immediate 
needs. It could be that party researchers are there to provide further research 
particularly with the ideology of the party in mind. Perhaps the surveyed 
chairpersons were of the view that there was no need to solicit political research 
provided that information was already received from the committee secretariat.  
4.1.3. Understanding Legislative Oversight 
It could be put that a key component of the political capacity of legislative 
committees is how well the chairperson understands the oversight obligations of their 
committee. Of the responses provided by the interviewed chairpersons, important 
links were made between oversight as a sort of input mechanism and accountability 
                                                 
36 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
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as the result of carrying out effective oversight. One of the chairpersons remarked 
that “you exercise oversight in order to achieve accountability”37.  
All of the chairpersons interviewed noted the fact that legislative oversight was a 
constitutionally entrenched obligation for committees to carry out. Furthermore, the 
function was embedded in the substantial Rules of Parliament as well as various 
other instruments of legislation. The chairpersons also paid attention to the fact that 
the oversight function was carried out by committees as part of the public 
representativeness mandate on behalf the electorate who voted for the parties 
represented in parliament. Thinking about this point in greater detail, the ability of a 
legislative committee to constantly keep in mind the importance of executing 
legislative oversight as a key mandate on behalf of the electorate could be argued to 
form a key component of the political capacity committees require to function 
optimally. Ideally, a committee, in carrying out its oversight duty, should be led by the 
notion of serving citizens of the country as public representatives and although 
difficult to definitively quantify, this forms a great part of the conceptualisation of 
political legislative committee capacity. One of the chairpersons interviewed went as 
far as to exclaim that, in his opinion, effective legislative oversight required the 
function to be rooted in the constituencies or on the ground to ensure that the 
ultimate result of accountability was being brought about to serve the interests of the 
South African public38. He went on to say that “you can’t have effective oversight 
unless you as committees and as members are engaging actively in the communities 
out there”39.  
What was found most interesting, which one chairperson outlined, was that oversight 
was simply much more than an in-locum site visit40. Oversight is carried out in a 
myriad of ways which included key tasks such as examining, evaluating and studying 
the performance of the department and entities the committee oversees41. Another 
chairperson indicated that oversight was comprised of a host of activities falling 
under the same banner of accountability such as ensuring that departments and 
entities are spending their budgets effectively and productively in line with their own 
                                                 
37 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
38 Interview 4: 26 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
39 Ibid  
40 Interview 3: 24 March 2015, Parliament of SA  
41 Ibid  
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stated objectives42. Oversight further serves to ascertain that departments met 
targets set out in their Annual Performance Plans, strategic plans and generally as 
mandated through their establishment.  
Looking back at the findings in terms of how chairpersons understood the function of 
legislative oversight and accountability, the two most common opinions were that the 
function was linked to scrutinising, measuring and evaluating what departments 
achieved against stated targeted aims and the budget it was allocated in order to 
achieve the above, i.e. spending vs. outcomes, or what one chairperson referred to 
as “following the money trail”43. The other common opinion involved the dynamic of 
holding the executive accountable as an important part of the role of public 
representatives. All five of the chairpersons interviewed mentioned one of these two 
major areas of legislative oversight. In terms of the literature reviewed, these two 
dynamics are critical in understanding the function of oversight so it could be argued 
that chairpersons positively grasped a primary obligation of their committees. 
Considering that it is one of the obligations of chairpersons to guide committee 
discussions and keep members united in collective tasks, leading with this 
understanding of oversight in mind bodes well for the political capacity of the 
committees sampled.  
The importance of fully understanding constitutional obligations and mandated 
functions behind the need for an accountable government and its democratic 
objective was highlighted by Jacobs, Power and Calland, when discussing the 
Corder Report, as a key aspect of effective oversight. The authors go on to say that 
“accountability and oversight can be at their most effective if recognised by those in 
power as the central organising principle” (Jacobs et al, 2001: 65).  
4.1.4. Role of the Chairperson 
As touched on in the preceding chapter, the position fulfilled by a chairperson is a 
crucial component of the capacity of a committee particularly looking at it through a 
politically-tinted lens. This argument is further supported in a civil society conference 
paper which argues that the quality of oversight is dependent on members of the 
committee but even more so the chairperson and the quality of leadership shown by 
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the chairperson (People’s Power, People’s Parliament, 2012: 45). All the 
chairpersons interviewed agreed that the role they play chairing the committee is to 
lead members. One of the chairpersons elaborated on this further to note that 
chairpersons are required to get to know the team of members it works with well 
enough specifically to get acquainted with each of their own skills set and qualities 
and then to harness this potential to ensure primary functions of the committee are 
carried out effectively44. The ability of chairpersons to understand the fundamental 
importance of their role and to actively execute it when chairing the committee is an 
important dynamic of the political capacity of a committee.  
The chairpersons interviewed agreed that they had the ability of providing leadership 
that was not biased and unreasonable but partial and fair given that a variety of 
political parties, each with their own interests and agenda, are represented on the 
various committees. The chairpersons interviewed acknowledged that they were 
obliged to justly and accurately represent the committee as a collective with one 
consenting voice that transcended party lines.  
Dynamics between the ANC chairs and committee members of other parties did not 
shine through brightly in the interviews. Mention was made of the fact that 
committees were essentially politically contested terrain but there was no indication 
of tension or strain between the chairs and members of differing political affiliation. 
Chairs surveyed reinforced the notion that “oversight weighs stronger than political 
affiliation”45. Looking however at the PMG minutes of the sampled committees within 
the timeframe of this study, insight into relations between members are at times 
highlighted. One such example is in the Portfolio Committee on Police where a DA 
member thanked the chairperson (ANC member) for chairing the particular meeting 
well “even though they did not always see eye to eye”46.  
It could be argued then that a committee is better capacitated when party-political 
dynamics do not hamper the work or operations of the committee which ultimately 
does require consensus and collective vision. More often than not a chairperson, as 
the committee leader, would guide the committee in cooperating in a unified fashion 
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as this is what is best in carrying out the mandate of committee work and reach 
definitive decisions. As already highlighted by an interviewed chairperson, the chair 
should harness the potential of members in the committee47 and this surely requires 
a sense of management or mediation should there be great political tensions 
between members. Where this is done and its evident the committee works through 
politically characterised differences assisted by strong leadership provided by the 
chair, political capacity would be deemed to be strong in such committees and would 
allow for the committee to operate optimally.  
However, it could be argued that where a chairperson lays down a set of guidelines 
perhaps on how the committee would be run or perhaps on issues which are non-
negotiable, ground rules are established for the particular committee specifically 
when it comes to an impasse or when decisions need to be taken. Should a 
chairperson display this ability and finesse it could be put that the said committee 
has increased capacity, in a political sense, in carrying out its primary functions, 
pertinent of which is oversight.  
Looking at the outcomes of the chairperson’s interviewed, it was found that some 
chairpersons were strict in laying such ground rules to guide the operation of the 
committee. One chairperson made it clear to the department and entities, when 
accounting to the committee, that no documents would be accepted seven days prior 
to the arranged meeting48. This makes it clear to those coming before the Committee 
what is acceptable and what is not and aids in the committee being taken seriously – 
a significant dynamic of the political capacity of the committee.  
Another example of how a committee chairperson sets clear guidelines in how the 
committee would be run, arose during an interview when the chairperson relayed 
that it was important for the committee to come together at the beginning of a 
particular session or term to map out the priorities of the committee, particularly in 
relation to its oversight mandate49. This committee compiled a numbered plan to 
prioritise how it would begin tackling oversight in relation to various aspects of the 
big department it overseas which also had a large number of entities in its ambit50. 
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One could argue that such a committee has a clear direction or sense of how it 
would approach the department and entities in carrying out its oversight function. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that such a committee, in coming together to plan its 
approach before hand, has a unified sense of collective where members, staff and 
the chairperson met at the beginning of a particular work period to agree on the best 
way of operation in terms of a priority-driven approach. In both senses then, the 
political capacity of the committee is elevated as far as these findings go. Similar 
reference is made in the Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services where mention is made of the practice of the Committee identifying focal 
areas to be zoned in on during the tenure of the Committee51.  
4.2 Executive - Legislative Relations 
Being the majority party, the ANC occupies the most seats in the National Assembly 
– this also means members of the party dominate committee membership and the 
executive arm of the country. This forms the basis for a large connective link 
between majority of members on the committee and the executive – both stem from 
the same party but the former is mandated to oversee the latter. The tensions 
between these two branches of the state are commonly highlighted. The literature 
review made extensive mention of this dimension which is common to parliamentary 
systems i.e. the degree of fusion between the executive and legislature and that 
while both branches differ in function, they share the same origin.  
However, dynamics of the often complex relationship between the minister, as the 
head of the department, and the chairperson, as the head of the committee, provide 
key insights into the political capacity that committee is said to have. Having said 
this, it would be difficult to analytically dissect such a relationship because there are 
many behavioural dynamics which could lead to many inferences or suggestions. 
However there are instances of where the political capacity of the committee could 
be constrained. For one, if there is a tense relationship between the chairperson and 
minister, this could make the function of oversight difficult in many ways. A minister 
could also not avail him or herself often enough to the committee and this too could 
have adverse effects on the committee ensuring executive accountability. Similarly, 
the chairperson could take a softer approach when dealing with the minister, as the 
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political senior, and this could affect for example, taking definitive committee 
decisions on a particular matter.  
All of the chairpersons interviewed found it very important that a sound working 
relationship develops between the chairperson and minister of the portfolio it 
oversees. What were most important to this relationship were shared values 
regarding oversight and the need for accountability. One of the chairpersons 
explained that ministers are involved in the input and output stage of the 
department’s activity i.e. involved in planning and setting targets and objectives 
(inputs) and ensuring the inputs yielded results most often in the form of service 
delivery (outputs). The legislature then found its role in keeping a watchful eye over 
the process overall and to measure or evaluate inputs against outputs. Oversight 
then, according to the chairperson, formed a vital part of service delivery to ensure it 
was carried out in a satisfactory manner52. At times, during committee meetings, 
members would express their thoughts on ministers heading the departments they 
oversee – such an example is seen in the PMG minutes of the portfolio committee 
on Trade and Industry where an opposition member felt that “the Department was 
fortunate to be led by a hardworking Minister”53.  This same member, in another 
meeting, noted that he “appreciated the Minister for always being on top of his game 
and it was always good to see a professional doing a good job54”.  
One of the chairpersons made an interesting point that committee members were 
quick to point out where a department or entity went wrong or did not achieve in a 
certain area of operation. However it is also part of legislative oversight for the 
committee to oversee the strategic plans and predetermined objectives, indicators 
and targets of the said department and entity. This would include assessing whether 
plans and targets were feasible given resources and budget etc. and generally 
identify weak areas or if the department was being too ambitious in certain areas – 
information which would then often be communicated to the Minister55. One could 
argue that, to an extent, where departments fail or fall short particularly in targeted 
areas of work, it could speak to the fact that the committee, led by the chairperson, 
did not carry out the mandate of oversight effectively, responsibly or robustly enough 
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– as was highlighted by this particular chairperson. Should this be the case, it could 
offer a useful period in which the committee could reflect on its operations, regroup 
dynamics of political capacity in respect of the relationship with the minister and 
establish how best to mitigate such an occurrence in the future. It could easily be 
said that a successful department and entities meeting targets and objectives as 
strategically planned out is as much a positive reflection of the department/entity 
itself as it is on the committee responsible for overseeing these processes and 
activities.  
Another chairperson made a point about the fact that there is often useful creative 
tension between the chairperson and minister as to the carrying out of differing 
mandates. He went on to explain that such tension could be complementary in that 
the mandates have in common serving the citizens of the country however from two 
different arms of the state and that any vibrant, thriving democracy had a level of 
healthy tension between the legislature and executive56. He also affirms the point 
brought up earlier that “where a committee exercises stringent and rigorous 
oversight this serves, in fact, to strengthen the executive”57.  
Moreover, in reviewing the findings on this particularly complex dynamic related to 
the political capacity of legislative committees, the interviewed chairpersons raised 
that fact that relationships between the chairperson and minister, like any other 
relationship, needs to be worked on – one chairperson remarked that working on the 
relationship was not easy at first but tensions were soon ironed out58. The most basic 
advantage of a sound working relationship between these political agents is that if 
issues arose, for instance a media report in the public domain, that the chairperson 
could easily and comfortably raise it with the Minister and ascertain from there how 
best to deal with the occurrence – the emphasis, from the findings, was on dealing 
with issues which may arise. Emphasis was placed on the respect that the two 
principals needed to have for the roles each played but with the shared ultimate 
objective of serving the needs of South Africans. The way in which this relationship 
plays itself out is a key dimension of the political capacity of the committee.  
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4.3 Reconciling Positions 
One of the chairpersons interviewed noted that, due to the electoral system and 
those dynamics of partial fusing of the executive and legislature, there is contested 
terrain between party positions and fulfilling the position of chairperson. The 
chairpersons recognised that although both he and the minister came from the same 
parties, they each had roles to play in different arms of the state. It was noted that it 
was constitutionally mandated that the legislature oversees the executive and, on the 
flip side of the coin, the executive is thus accountable to the legislature. The 
chairperson believed that there was an understanding of these roles which was 
respected by all political parties and from the side of the legislature and members of 
the executive.  
As has been repeated throughout this chapter that committees are essentially 
politically-charged entities simply due to the different political parties that members 
represent, a chairperson highlighted that there would also be political differences in 
committee because of this. She said that there were certain issues parties would 
never agree on and this should be recognised but “not everything you tackle is 
ideological”59. She found it important to tackle committee tasks robustly by allowing 
everyone to air their views freely and that this could actually make for a more 
effective committee because one party might raise something that another party 
overlooked. From there, compromise could be attempted. She highlighted that it was 
important for the committee to maintain the united vision of working together mainly 
because the committee was working to improve the lives of all South Africans60. For 
a committee to operate bearing this in mind and with it reinforced by the chairperson, 
it could be said such a committee is working from a strong base of political capacity.  
One of the chairpersons highlighted that issues were not shied away from in his 
committee simply because of “political business” or if an issue was controversial61. 
The chairperson made it clear that issues were dealt with in committee as “oversight 
weighs stronger than political affiliation”62. Another chairperson was more adamant 
of the fact that there was no need to reconcile chairmanship or legislative 
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membership with membership of a political party63. He outlined that one of the 
primary functions of the committee was oversight particularly in the sense that the 
committee oversees the plans of the department and implementation thereof against 
the budget the legislature endorsed for that specific department. He said that this 
was a task to carry out and “there was no party in that”64. If the committee, as led by 
the chairperson, can maintain that issues would not be shied away from and that 
arguably issues of party simply do not have place in committee work then such a 
committee would have the political capacity to execute its oversight tasks without 
fear or favour but through the powers conferred to it in the Constitution, legislation 
and Rules of Parliament.  
4.4 Compliance 
The above discussion of recognising the mandates of the executive and the 
legislature could be said to be a normative or ideal argument and the reality might 
not always play itself out in that way. Chairpersons interviewed were questioned 
about executive and departmental forthrightness in providing information needed by 
the committee to carry out meaningful oversight.  
The findings in this regard point to departments and entities compliance with 
providing information as widely varied, inconsistent, erratic and dependent on the 
committee and department in question. It was highlighted that some departments 
were generally more accommodating while other departments needed to be asked 
more than once65. It might also depend on the executive and DG of the department 
and the general quality of staff in terms of timeous submission of information, 
according to one chairperson66. It was highlighted in the legacy report of the 
communications portfolio committee that there were a number reports outstanding 
from the department and its entities – this is a practical example of non-compliance 
in terms of submission of information.  
However, three of the five chairpersons interviewed found that departments were 
reasonably cooperative. The ability of the committee to ensure that they were taken 
seriously and departments or the executive did not appear to be treating the 
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committee with contempt, could be argued as the committee having the political 
capacity to carry out its oversight function meaningfully.  
Two of the chairpersons interviewed did not experience problems with the executive 
or department providing information required from the committee67. However it would 
be important to qualify this particular finding - both chairpersons had been part of the 
legislature and chaired committees for many years and so had the time to build a 
foundation and stamp their authority, if you will, as chairpersons in terms of what was 
acceptable and not acceptable. One of the chairpersons mentioned previously made 
it clear that the department or entities accounting before the committee could not 
submit documents or information less than seven days prior to the arranged 
meeting68. This ensured members had adequate time to engage the information and 
arrive at meetings fully prepared. It could be argued that should such ground rules 
be laid out in terms of the department and executive providing information, it 
provides the committee with the political capacity to execute its oversight tasks.   
PMG minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs for 
February 2013, where the Committee was meeting with the Department of Water on 
its methodology and criteria used to decide on the performance targets and 
indicators reflected in its strategic plan and annual performance plan, point to the 
fact that some committees do at times struggle with non-compliance – the minutes 
state “the Chairperson was disappointed that the documents had arrived only that 
morning. It was very hard for Members to engage properly unless they had a chance 
to read briefing documents at least the night before”69.  
Another such example is from the Portfolio Committee on Police where the 
Committee was not pleased with the quality of the presentation delivered to the 
Committee during a meeting where the SA Police Service (or Department of Police) 
was due to report back to Members on progress made implementing the Budgetary 
Review and Recommendations Report (BRRR) recommendations of the Committee. 
PMG minutes reflect that the Chairperson “demanded a fully re-worked document 
must be returned to the Committee...even if the Department worked through the 
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night. If SAPS thought this Committee would be satisfied with the presentation, then 
it clearly did not know the Committee well enough70”. This is an example of how 
some Committee’s experience the challenge of non-compliance.    
One chairperson made the fascinating point that the committee should work closely 
with departments by a) giving them sufficient time to prepare for meetings and b) aid 
them in understanding why oversight over certain tasks or areas of the department 
are carried out71. The chairperson said this would prevent oversight being seen as 
an “obstacle test” and so would allow the department to be more responsive to the 
committee in terms of provision of information. It would also make for a better 
prepared department when appearing before the committee because of a newfound 
understanding of why certain questions were asked or what information would be 
interrogated. The chairperson alluded to the point that oversight was not necessarily 
an exercise to test which arm of the state was stronger but a mutually strengthening 
effort72, if you will, and if the committee operates with this in mind, it would enable 
responsiveness from the department.  
Interviewed chairpersons were also asked about instances in which the executive 
and department failed to comply with specific committee requests. The findings 
largely corresponded to what was discussed above in that three of the five the 
chairpersons interviewed highlighted that there were definite cases of non-
compliance and only two chairpersons interviewed found that this was not something 
that their committee experienced73. It was found that cases of non-compliance with 
minor matters such as providing responses to questions which might not have been 
answered in a previous committee meeting or failure to submit reports by a certain 
deadline, was a regular occurrence for some committees. One of the chairpersons 
who had a different experience indicated that she did not have the misfortune of 
having the executive or department not comply with a specific committee request74. 
She also acknowledged the rarity of her experience after speaking with her 
colleagues from other committees75. Typically, the responses to the question were 
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along the lines of “all the time” and “of course” etc. which gave rise to the inference 
drawn that it was a regular occurrence.  
Significance could be attached to this finding because it provides evidence of the 
practical and realistic dynamics of the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature in contrast to the theoretically ideal cooperative relations painted earlier 
on in the chapter. The finding also supports earlier arguments relating to the 
asymmetry between the executive and the legislature especially so in terms of the 
provision of information required for oversight and scrutiny. Noting in the previous 
chapter the importance of information as the source of power when conducting 
legislative oversight, such a finding raises concerns with regard to political capacity. 
To touch on just one of the reviewed pieces of literature, the HSRC, reporting on 
organs of state accountable to and overseen by Parliament, highlighted that “the flow 
of information was the lifeblood of accountability” (2006: 11).  
The two chairpersons outlined above whom did not experience problems with 
departments complying with committee requests, were the same chairpersons 
mentioned previously who stamped their authority and formed the springboard of 
committee action by laying distinct ground rules in terms of what was acceptable to 
the committee and what was not76. From this we can also infer that the agency of the 
committee chair is therefore an important variable in ensuring greater executive 
responsiveness. Furthermore this agency is absent from committees which 
experienced unresponsive departments. It could also be argued that this agency still 
needed to be developed amongst some of the chairpersons interviewed who were 
relatively new to the job. 
Coming back to the original point, the finding that departments and the executive 
often did not provide information needed by the committee timeously or at all, is a 
concerning one given the important link between information and oversight. It also 
points again to asymmetries of power highlighted extensively in the previous chapter. 
It clearly elucidates the fact that the department and executive hold information that 
the committee requires and so then the committee is dependent on the executive or 
department for this vital requirement. The committee and chairperson however could 
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use its political capacity by evening out asymmetries or inequalities by making it 
clear that the department is obliged to provide information it might require by a strict 
deadline the committee sets out and that there would be implications if this was not 
done. The two chairpersons mentioned have laid this basis from which the 
committee works and so has built the political capacity to ensure it gets what it wants 
from the executive, department or entity. From those committees which experienced 
unresponsiveness, we can assume that the chairperson did not lay down these 
ground rules but that if they did, it could be sufficient to change the situation.  
4.5 Impediments to conducting effective oversight 
One of the chairpersons, when posed with this question, noted that at times the 
understanding and expertise of committee members presented itself as an 
impediment to conducting effective oversight77. Although he linked this to being 
caused primarily by structural capacity deficiencies, he outlined that committee 
members lacked content knowledge78. This ties in with one of the research findings 
of this study – in looking at the committee sample in more detail, specifically the 
members of the committee, it was found many members did not have experience or 
an educational background in the sector of work falling within the scope of the 
committee. This finding is given more substance in that another chairperson also 
noted it as one of the largest impediments to effective legislative oversight conducted 
by the committee79. In terms of how MPs are allocated to committees, parties 
nominate their own members to the Speaker of the National Assembly for approval. 
It is not known what determinants parties use to make these allocations and if they 
take into account members’ knowledge and experience of particular sectors. Being 
unable to determine this, it could imply that sector knowledge is not sufficiently taken 
into account. 
Not only did the expertise of members come up as an impediment but more than one 
chairperson noted the negative effect of a lack of continuity of committee 
membership. One of the chairpersons elaborated on this point to say that he felt five 
years was a relatively short amount of time in that just as members were beginning 
to fully comprehend the work of the committee in relation to maintaining oversight 
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over the executive, department and entity, a new election year would bring in a new 
crop of members and this capacity had to be built from its foundation again80. This 
argument points to a loss of institutional memory and this in itself is a large 
component of the political capacity of committees as discussed in the beginning of 
this chapter.  
The argument is raised further in one of the ranking questions in the interview where 
chairpersons were asked if they viewed the understanding of members of the 
committee of the work of the executive and departments they are meant to oversee 
as well as the members’ ability to ask informed questions during meeting time as 
“very poor”, “poor”, “good” or “very good”. Looking at the results, the outcomes do 
not reflect the qualitative answers highlighted in the previous paragraph. All the 
chairpersons surveyed rated both items as “good”. 
On further analysis it could be there that there should have been another ranking 
grade between “poor” and “good” – this would explain why the chairpersons thought 
the performance of committee members in these areas were more on the good side 
than the poor side. In fact one of the chairpersons surveyed stated that he was of the 
opinion that both items fell between the “poor” and “good” categories81. It could also 
be argued that none of the chairpersons noted the performance as “very good” which 
could indicate that there are definite elements lacking in the capacity committee 
members bring to committee. This analysis, together with the qualitative data 
discussed above, point to decreased political capacity in this particular dynamic of 
the committee.  
Another politically characterised dynamic which could impede legislative oversight as 
raised by at least two interviewed chairpersons was non-cooperation of the 
department or entity especially in terms of making information or data available82. It 
has however been discussed earlier in the chapter that this was a challenge 
applicable to some committees and not others. Links between oversight and 
information available were also explicitly discussed in this dissertation so given this, 
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this impediment is a serious obstacle in the execution of effective legislative 
oversight. 
This is even more so as findings show, at least in the sample this dissertation made 
use of, that non-cooperation or a lack of forthrightness by the executive or 
department is something more committees than not are limited by. It is important to 
reiterate the vital links between information and the power having the correct 
information is to carrying out successful oversight by committees so having this 
access impeded negatively impacts on the political capacity of the committee. This 
impediment succinctly ties in with the impediment speaking to the asymmetry 
between the executive and legislature in terms of information and access to it in the 
chapter discussing resource or physical capacity.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter will provide a summary of the main findings and outcomes of the 
primary discussion surrounding legislative capacity.  
The conceptual framework of this study was outlined in chapter one where a 
foundation was laid for the discussion to ensue later in the paper. Establishing an 
understanding of the dynamics and key variables relating to legislative capacity as 
thought of by this dissertation along the lines of physical resources and political 
characterisations of the committees, is essential to understanding what comprised 
the entire picture of capacity. This was particularly framed around one of the salient 
functions of the institution, namely, oversight.  
This dissertation discussed oversight as one of the salient functions of any legislative 
institution and furthermore set up a greater understanding of this function by situating 
it within a wide literature review looking at the broader assumptions relating to 
oversight, the theory of separation of powers and complex executive-legislative 
relations. The dissertation also looked at theoretical assumptions relating to 
institutionalisation laying the foundations for a more practical discussion on the 
significance of capacity for executing this constitutionally emboldened function of 
oversight and accountability.  
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This dissertation primarily set out to investigate and provide insights into the 
institutional capacity of the legislative committee system of the South African 
National Assembly. Parliamentary committees are key centres of power in the 
institution and so developing a clearer, and importantly current, picture of their 
operations is key in framing a broader debate on legislative strength or weakness.  
The aim was further to narrow this discussion on operations down to one of the chief 
functions of committees, namely oversight. The study then took its cue to look at the 
polar ends of capacity i.e. elements of capacity relating to physical resources and 
those relating to political dynamics, and develop findings or outcomes on capacity to 
execute this particular legislative function.  
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Institutional capacity was conceptualised as comprising of two complementary 
camps – on the one hand, variables relating to structural or “hard” resources and 
then variables relating to aspects and dynamics that were more political or “soft” in 
nature. Conceptually it was proposed that both structural or physical resources and 
then political dynamics form the institutional capacity which ground committees and 
from which their actions, decisions and operations spring from.  
The chapters outlining the first hand findings and outcomes provided insight into an 
assessment of legislative capacity and largely pointed to a mixed result – in some 
areas of “hard” resources and some areas of political, or “soft”, dynamics, capacity 
was bold and enriched the committee operations while in other areas it was evident 
that the institution needed to work harder to build and develop capacity for effective 
oversight. It was also prominently revealed that capacity, in its entirety, differs from 
one committee to the next as demonstrated by the survey of seven portfolio 
committees this study developed as outlined in the methodology.  
This study began on the point that not much scholarly and academic attention had 
been paid to a comprehensive overview of the most important instrument to conduct 
oversight and maintain accountability, namely, legislative committees. It could be 
argued that this study makes progress in wading through the dense scenery of 
oversight and providing greater, updated insights into the operations and working of 
these parliamentary engine rooms. It could also be argued that this study has 
contributed to discussion on the capacity committees draw from to conduct the 
exercise of oversight and developed a sound framework through which to 
conceptualise of this capacity. The discussion is useful considering that, as 
highlighted by the framing Barkan paper, often great broad stroke assumptions are 
made of legislative performance without qualifying these assumptions with detailed 
substantiation.  
Although the findings are mixed and show that there are certain variables or 
elements in both structural capacity and capacity relating to political dynamics that 
are lacking, much of the qualitative interviews conducted make reference to the fact 
that capacity in its entirety has increased substantially over the years. Chairpersons 
and research staff surveyed pointed out committees often made do with much less 
than the capacity enjoyed by committees currently. This infers that legislative 
83 
 
committees of the National Assembly have come a long way in making strides to 
improve and increase capacity – if this trajectory is followed and there is a concerted 
effort to identify and work areas of capacity that are lacking, legislative effectiveness 
could increase across the board.  
5.1.1 Hard resources impacting committee capacity  
The study looked at a variety of sub-variables relating to “hard” or physical resources 
comprising legislative committee capacity. These were broadly categorised 
according to physical resources, budgetary allocations and human resources, in the 
form of support staff. To recap on methodology, findings and outcomes stem from 
the anonymous interviews with committee chairpersons and research staff – mostly 
content advisers – of the committees comprising the sample utilised by this study. 
Primary data was also collected on a number of quantitative variables to develop a 
dataset on each sample committee.  
As previous highlighted this chapter, outcomes and findings related to “hard” 
resources were varied and differed from one committee to the next. The study 
provided insight into the fact that some committees have a larger department to 
oversee and/or more public entities to oversee as well which generally translates to a 
greater workload for such a committee. This would invariably impact on the capacity 
of resources available to the committee across various sub-variable categories. 
However this paper has shown that resources are provided equitably across the 
board to committees therefore not taking cognisance of the fact that workloads vary 
from one committee to the next. This was displayed in both the way budgets were 
allocated and human resources, or support staff were allocated – all committees in 
the sample had one secretary, one executive secretary for the chairperson, one 
assistant, one research and one content adviser – the only outliers in this finding 
were the committees of police and trade and industry where the former had two 
researchers and the latter had two secretaries. 
Inferences were also made around the fact that although chairpersons were largely 
happy with the quality of work displayed by overworked support staff, particularly 
from the research side, committees critically required more skills with the aim of 
forming team of research and secretariat staff rallying behind Members and the 
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chairperson to provide that technical assistance instead of having the current bare 
minimum. 
Related to this was the fact that this dissertation found that budget and human 
resources were arguably chief in terms of resource capacity while other sub-
variables, such as library, equipment and technology etc. were secondary. This 
provides a significant indication of how salient these two aspects are to committee 
capacity. In line with what the Barkan paper found ten years ago, the South African 
Parliament indeed does have all the trimmings one might assume a modern day 
legislature would enjoy – I refer here to spacious committee meeting rooms with 
microphones, Powerpoint presentation facilities and air conditioning with some 
venues even equipped with cameras to live stream proceedings on Parliament’s 
dedicated DSTV or YouTube channel. 
The importance of committee capacity, both in terms of “hard” resources and 
politically “soft” dynamics, were revealed through the interviews with chairpersons - 
out of varying options of where chairpersons spent the most time in legislative work, 
the unanimous finding was that all chairperson surveyed spent majority of their time, 
i.e. over 50 per cent, working in and chairing the committee. 
This study also made the point that it is evident that there is not a clear cut amount of 
resource capacity one could argue as being sufficient. However findings show, both 
from the qualitative data gathered from interviewed chairpersons and research staff, 
that there is undoubtedly a need to develop further capacity especially for those 
committees which oversee bigger departments, more entities and generally have a 
higher workload. The ultimate argument here is that the more resource capacity a 
committee has, the more it would be able to do in terms of oversight. 
The study also spoke at length about clear resource asymmetries or imbalances 
between the resource capacity of the legislature vis-a-vis that of the executive. This 
was a considerable factor arising during the literature review and it was confirmed 
through the qualitative information provided by the interviewed chairpersons and 
research staff. The paper discussed various manifestations of this resource 
inequality but a pertinent aspect of this asymmetry, especially in relation to the 
legislative function of oversight, was the imbalance of information between the two 
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arms of the state. The study repeatedly pointed to the salience of independent 
information when conducting oversight and the fact that the legislature is largely 
dependent on the executive and departments for information leaves a considerable 
gap in the capacity of structural resources. 
5.1.2 Political environment/soft dynamics impacting committee capacity 
This study looked at a variety of sub-variables relating to political, or “soft” dynamics 
comprising legislative committee capacity. These were largely conceptualised as 
including committee membership and chairpersonship – as members were thought 
of as largely political commodities in their seats and positions were acquired 
according to political partisan processes, it was argued that these individuals would 
such form part of political capacity. Other sub-variables included variances of 
political involvement, understanding of legislative oversight and executive-legislative 
relations. This chapter of findings was distinct from the first in that political dynamics 
are intangible and “soft” and so outcomes stem from inferences, arguments and 
general discussion on the elements of capacity as opposed to the more straight 
forward points regarding structural or “hard” resources. Overall the underlying 
conceptualisation of these elements of capacity was the political will and political 
autonomy to enable committees to carry out its oversight mandate optimally. 
As previously highlighted in this chapter and in much the same vein as the 
concluding remarks on structural resource capacity, findings and outcomes for 
legislative committee capacity relating to political dynamics pointed to a mixed 
picture where capacity was at best varied and differed from one committee to the 
next. 
While having not looked into the educational and employment history of all members 
of the seven portfolio committees sampled, this study did look into this history for 
chairpersons. While only one of the chairpersons did not have a university degree, 
all the other chairpersons had degrees, with many also achieving postgraduate 
status. Coupled with work experience that could arguably be beneficial to the 
committee in an indirect way (i.e. not in the direct sector of work of the committee), 
an initial good picture developed of political capacity looking at these sub-variables. 
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Outcomes also revealed that the committee chairpersons sampled had a firm grasp 
and understanding of the notion and salience of executing an oversight mandate. 
The argument was that as chairperson, the individual led committee discourse, 
debate and ultimately decisions taken and so it was an important aspect of political 
capacity for committee operations. Important links were drawn between oversight, 
accountability, checks and powers and constitutionally enshrined mandates. This is 
also an essential aspect of capacity given that committee work generally, and 
holding the executive, departments and public entities accountable specifically, 
requires unified committee membership and a collective understanding so it was 
important for chairpersons to lead the committee with this thinking. 
This chapter argued that the position fulfilled by committee chairperson was critical 
to the political capacity enjoyed by the committee. It was highlighted that complex 
political dynamics relating to varying relations between committee members is 
distinct from one committee to the next – each committee has a different character 
and disposition of members and between members. One of the important roles of the 
chairperson is to provide leadership and coherently guide the ship so that such 
varying relations do not hamper carrying out oversight. The ability of the chairperson 
to do so is arguably an important aspect of political capacity for optimal oversight. 
The paper further positioned that the chairperson set the tone for what was 
acceptable in the committee and what was not in terms of departmental compliance, 
methods of working etc. and the finesse and management style of the chairperson to 
lay ground rules and boundaries was another important dimension of political 
capacity. 
In discussion on compliance by the executive, departments and public entities in 
terms of providing information, responding to requests and general submission of 
documents required by the committee, it was found that committees, or those of the 
sample anyway, lacked political capacity to enforce that such non-compliance was 
unacceptable. Only two of the interviewed chairpersons expressed that they had no 
real problems in terms of compliance while the other chairpersons indicated that this 
was a potentially challenging area. This could be tied in with the discussion on 
information asymmetries discussed earlier in this conclusion. This is concerning 
giving the crucial links between information and carrying out legislative oversight. 
87 
 
It is pertinent to reiterate that there are diversities in political, or “soft”, dynamics 
comprising political capacity from one committee to the next. While the findings 
discussed displayed a varied picture in terms of political capacity, the study made it 
clear that some committees have a deeper well of capacity to draw from while others 
needed to develop this capacity to a greater extent. 
However, as the conceptual framework of this study had laid out, both sides of 
institutional capacity (structural resources and political dynamics) are crucial for the 
committee to conduct oversight optimally and in the most effective manner. 
5.2 Areas for future consideration 
One of the points elucidated in this study was that the function of oversight was an 
on-going, continuous and cyclical exercise that had no real definitive limit or by 
simply engaging one or a few documents could it be said the exercise was complete. 
Much of the literature echoed this and thus highlighted the need for committee 
capacity to be able to systematically track department and entity performance and 
progress constantly. This is further substantiated by Murray and Nijzink who state 
that it is important for the entire legislative committee system to “be geared to 
oversight” and this entails the execution of systematic oversight and not the function 
being carried out on an ad hoc basis (2002: 111). 
Another pertinent point which has emerged is that although oversight and 
accountability are mutually inclusive and the assumption has been such that 
oversight is executed to achieve accountability, Jacobs et al highlight that the 
process of oversight is crucial to improvement of service delivery and administration 
of the public sector (2001: 63). This was further elucidated at length in the chapter on 
political dynamics of capacity where it is essential that a committee is politically 
capacitated to the extent that the committee operates as a cohesive unit with a 
common objective in mind which should be to ensure improved and progressing 
service delivery. The point was further emphasised by one of the chairperson’s 
interviewed who alluded to the fact that the committee should be with the department 
in every step of its processes in terms of setting targets, allocating budgets and the 
ensuring the predetermined outcomes are met. In this way, an effective government 
department is very much a reflection on the quality of committee oversight should the 
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common objective of service delivery and quality of government be kept in mind. 
Jacobs et al additionally argue the point by indicating that “an effective parliament 
should be the basis for effective government” (2001: 69). 
According to Murray and Nijzink, the function of oversight is one of the most difficult 
of the legislative mandates (2002: 111). The function however is salient and intrinsic 
to effective democratic governance so impediments in the way of effective execution 
of oversight vitally needs to be addressed especially so in terms of ensuring the 
committee system is empowered through capacity to match a comprehensive 
theoretical framework. While the variables discussed in this study are only a portion 
of indicators relating to legislative committee capacity, the discussion and findings 
provide information and keen insight into the work of these centres of institutional 
power. 
89 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alabi, Mojeed Olujinmi, A. 2009. “The Legislatures in Africa: A Trajectory of 
Weakness”. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. 3:5. 
Retrieved: 12 May 2013 From: http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR 
 
Annual Report of the Department of Communications 2013/14. Retrieved: 8 
September 2015, From: http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/doc_annual_report_2013_14_low_res.pdf  
 
Annual Report of the Department of Correctional Services 2013/14. Retrieved: 14 
April 2015, From: 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/Publications/Annual%20Reports/DCS%20Annual%20Report
%202013-14.pdf  
 
Annual Report of the Department of Energy 2013/14. Retrieved: 22 April 2015, From: 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/Annual%20Reports/DoE-Annual-Report-2013-14.pdf  
 
Annual Report of the Department of Environmental Affairs 2013/14, Retrieved: 22 
April 2015, From: 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/reports/annual_report2013_14.pdf  
 
Annual Report of the Department of Police 2013/14 Financial Year. Retrieved: 22 
April 2015, From: 
http://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2013_2014/ar2014_01_
parta.pdf  
 
Annual Report of the Department of Social Development for the year ended 31 
March 2014. Retrieved: 22 April 2015, From: http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/dsd_ar14-_desktop.pdf  
 
Annual Report of the Department of Trade and Industry 2013 – 2014. Retrieved: 22 
April 2015, From:  http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/dti_AR2014_a.pdf  
 
90 
 
Annual Report of the Department of Water Affairs 2013/14. Retrieved: 22 April 2015, 
From: 
https://www.dwa.gov.za/documents/AnnualReports/DWA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT
%202013-14.pdf  
 
Arter, David. 2006. “Introduction: Comparing the Legislative Performance of 
Legislatures”. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 12: 3-4. Retrieved: 12 May 2013, 
From: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330600875432 
 
Bagenholm, Andreas. 2008.  Understanding Governmental Legislative Capacity. 
Retrieved: 14 September 2015, From:  
https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/18372/1/gupea_2077_18372_1.pdf 
 
Baldwin, Nicholas, D.J. 2006. “Concluding Observations: Legislative Weakness, 
Scrutinising Strength?” Journal of Legislative Studies. 10: 2 – 3. Retrieved 6 May 
2014. From: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1357233042000322373 
 
Barkan, Joel. D. 2008. “Legislature’s on the Rise?” Journal of Democracy. 19: 2. 
Retrieved: 06 June 2011. From: http: 
//muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/vol19/19.2barkan.html  
 
Benton, Meghan and Russell, Meg. 2012. “Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary 
Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons”. 
Parliamentary Affairs. 66: 4. Retrieved: 14 January 2014. From: 
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/ 
 
Calland, Richard (ed). 1999. The First Five Years – A Review of South Africa’s 
Democratic Parliament. Cape Town: Idasa Publishers.  
 
Calland, Richard. 2006. Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power? Cape 
Town: Zebra Press. 
 
Corder, Hugh, Jagwanth, Saras & Soltau, Fred. 1999. Report on Parliamentary 
Oversight and Accountability. Cape Town: UCT Law Faculty 
91 
 
 
February, Judith. 2006. “Why Oversight is Parliament’s Blind Spot”. Retrieved 14 
September 2015, From: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/why-oversight-is-
parliament-s-blind-spot-1.264817  
 
Fourth Parliament Budget Vote (2014) Retrieved 10 June 2015, From: 
www.parliament.gov.za/live/contentpopup.php?Item_ID=3587&Category_ID=  
 
Friedberg, Chen. 2011. “From a Top-Down to a Bottom-Up Approach to Legislative 
Oversight”. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 17:4. Retrieved: 14 May 2014 From: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13572334.2011.617554#.VdsW8iWqpB
c  
 
Friedberg, Chen & Hazan, Reuvan. 2012. “Legislative Oversight”. Comparative 
Assessment of Parliaments (CAP) Note. Retrieved: 31 March 2014 From: 
http://www.cid.suny.edu/capnotes1/LegislativeOversight_071112.pdf  
 
Honeyman, Amanda. 2013. An Evaluation of the Queensland Parliamentary 
Committee System: From Fitzgerald to Recent Reforms. Retrieved: 3 March 2014, 
From: 
http://www.anzacatt.org.au/parliament/general/anzacatt/anzacatt.nsf/44df1231aa617
5f0ca2575c50013ebe6/09cd95435af152a2ca257c2800091777/$FILE/29785492.pdf/
Amanda%20Honeyman%20Final%20PLPP%20Assignment_final.pdf  
 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) (Democrcay and Governance 
Programme). 2006. “Report on Organs of State Accountable to and Overseen by 
Parliament” 
 
Jacobs, Sean, Power, Greg and Calland, Richard. 2001. Real Politics: The Wicked 
Issues. IDASA: Cape Town  
 
Khmelko, Irina. S and Beers, Daniel. J.2011. “Legislative Oversight in the Ukrainian 
Rada: Assessing the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees”. The Journal of 
Legislative Studies. 17:4. Retrieved: 1 June 2014, From:  
92 
 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13572334.2011.617553#.VdsU1yWqpB
c  
 
Krause, George. 2003. Uncertainty and Legislative Capacity for Controlling the 
Bureaucracy. Retrieved: 14 September 2015, From: 
http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/sites/sc.edu.poli/files/krause1005.pdf?q=sites/defa
ult/files/krause1005.pdf  
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Communications on its Activities 
Undertaken During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Retrieved: 24 
March 2015, From: http://pmg.org.za/files/communications.doc  
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on its Activities 
Undertaken During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Retrieved: 24 
March 2015, From: https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17108/  
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its Activities Undertaken 
During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Retrieved: 15 April 2014, From: 
http://pmg.org.za/files/pc_energy.pdf  
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Police on its Activities Undertaken 
During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Retrieved: 14 May 2014, From: 
http://pmg.org.za/files/pcpolicereport.doc   
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Social Development on its Activities 
Undertaken During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Dated 12 March 
2014. Retrieved 4 April 2014, From: https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17062/  
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on its Activities 
Undertaken During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Adopted 12 March 
2014. Retrieved: 7 April 2014, From: https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17089/  
 
93 
 
Legacy Report of the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs on its 
Activities Undertaken During the 4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). Retrieved: 
11 October 2014, From: https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/2190/  
 
Lord Norton of Louth. 2011. “Effective Capacity Building: The Capacity To Do 
What?” Paper from International Conference: Effective Capacity Building 
Programmes for Parliamentarians. Retrieved: 14 September 2015, From:   
http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/asgp11/norton.pdf 
 
Mahiuddin, K.M. 2009. “The Parliamentary Committee System in Bangladesh: An 
Analysis of its Functioning. PhD Dissertation. Department of Political Science: South 
Asia Institute. Retrieved: 23 January 2014, From: http://archiv.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/volltextserver/9565/1/Parliamentary_Committees_in_Bangladesh.pdf  
 
Martin, Shane. 2010. “The Committee System”. The first draft of a chapter prepared 
for inclusion in MacCarthaigh, Muiris and Manning, Maurice (eds) The Houses of the 
Oireachtas. Dublin: Institute if Public Administration.  Retrieved: 14 January 2014, 
From: https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/politics/people/dr-shane-martin/pdfs/the-
committee-system 
 
Monk, David. 2009. “In the Eye of the Beholder? A Framework for Testing the 
Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees”. Parliamentary Studies, Paper 10, 
Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, 
Canberra. Retrieved: 14 January 2014. From: www.parliamentarystudies.anu.edu.au 
 
Murray, Christina and Nijzink, Lia. 2002. Representative Democracy: South Africa’s 
Legislatures and the Constitution. First Edition. Cape Town: Parliamentary Support 
Programme  
 
National Treasury. 2005. Guideline for Legislative Oversight through Annual Reports. 
Research Paper commissioned by the National Treasury for further discussion and 
debate by Parliament and provincial legislatures, with the aim of improving the 
process for using annual reports as a key oversight tool. Retrieved 15 October 2013, 
From: 
94 
 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/guidelines/Guideline%20for%20Legislati
ve%20Oversight%20through%20Annual%20Reports.pdf  
 
Nijzink, Lia & Piombo, Jessica. 2004. “The Institutions of Representative 
Democracy”. Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) Working Paper No. 58. 
Retrieved: 10 June 2015, From:  
 
Nijzink, Lia, Shaheen Mozaffar and Elisabete Azevedo. 2006. “Can Parliaments 
Enhance the Quality of Democracy on the African Continent? An Analysis of 
Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions”. Democracy in Africa Research Unit. 
Centre for Social Studies Research. CSSR Working Paper 10. Retrieved: 14 January 
2014, From: http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/pubs/wp160.pdf  
 
Oversight and Accountability Model: Asserting Parliament’s Oversight Role in 
Enhancing Democracy. 2011. Retrieved: 31 March 2014, From 
http://www.sals.gov.za/research/oversight_model.pdf  
 
“People’s Power, People’s Parliament”. 13 - 15 August 2012. A Civil Society 
Conference on South Africa’s Legislatures. A Report on Proceedings and Issues at 
the People’s Power Conference: Cape Town  
 
PMG Minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Police 19 April 2013, Retrieved 10 June 
2015, From:  
 
PMG Minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Police 4 March 2014, Retrieved 10 June 
2015, From:  
 
PMG Minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 23 April 2013, 
Retrieved 10 June 2015, From:  
 
PMG Minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 1 March 2014, 
Retrieved 10 June 2015, From  
 
95 
 
PMG Minutes of the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs 27 
February 2013, Retrieved 10 June 2015, From  
 
Public Finance Management Act, 1999, Act 1 of 1999. Retrieved: 15 January 2015, 
From: 
http://www.pprotect.org/legislation/docs/PUBLIC%20FINANCE%20MANAGEMENT
%20ACT%201%20OF%201999.pdf  
 
Rapoo, Thabo. 2004. “Rating the Effectiveness of Legislative Oversight Methods and 
Techniques: The Views of Senior Public Service Officials”. Centre for Policy Studies: 
Policy Brief 34. Retrieved: 14 September 2015, From: 
http://www.cps.org.za/cps%20pdf/polbrief34.pdf  
 
Rules of the National Assembly, 2008, 6th Edition. Cape Town: Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa  
 
Rules of the National Assembly. 2016. 9th Edition. Cape Town. Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa  
 
Senay, Claude and Besdziek, Dirk. 1999. “Enhancing Oversight in South Africa’s 
Provinces: Institutions and Concerns. African Security Review. 8:2. Retrieved: 6 
June 2011. From: www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/8No2/Senay.html 
 
Shaw, Michael. 1998. “Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective”, In: 
Longley, Lawrence and Davidson, Roger, H, The New Roles of Parliamentary 
Committees. Frank Cass: New York  
 
Taljaard, Raenette, Venter, Albert and Jolobe, Zwelethu. 2011. “Parliament”. In: 
Venter, Albert and Landsberg, Chris (ed’s) Government and Politics in the New 
South Africa. Cape Town: Van Schaik Publishers  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996. Pretoria: 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development  
 
96 
 
Van der Westhuizen, Christi. 2014. “Working Democracy: Perspectives on South 
Africa’s Parliament at 20 Years”. European Union: Cape Town  
 
Volden, Craig and Wiseman, Alan, E. 2009. “Legislative Effectiveness in Congress”. 
The Ohio State University. Retrieved: 14 January 2014 From: 
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/alanwiseman/files/2011/08/LEP_webpage_090710.pdf  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Addendum One: Committee Sample 
 
 
 
CLUSTER COMMITTEE BUDGET (Final 
Appropriation) 
No. of Entities 
(Reporting to 
the Minister) 
Staff Size (Posts 
Filled) 
1. Infrastructure 
Development 
Energy R6 503 billion 6 550 
2. Economic 
Sectors and 
Employment 
Trade and 
Industry 
R9 515 billion 14 1286 
3. Justice, Crime 
Prevention and 
Security 
Correctional 
Services 
R18 748 billion 0 41 825 
4. Economic 
Sectors and 
Employment 
Communications R2 372 billion 7 333 
5. Social 
Protection and 
Community 
Development 
Social 
Development 
R118 511 billion 3 678 
6. International 
Cooperation, 
Trade and 
Security 
Water and 
Environmental 
Affairs 
R10 375 billion + 
R5 206 billion = 
R15 581 billion 
16 + 4 = 20 7336 + 1588 = 
8924 
7. Justice, Crime 
Prevention and 
Security 
Police R68 791 billion 3 194 852 
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Addendum Two: Full Complement of Portfolio Committees in the National 
Assembly for the Year under Review 
 
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  
2. Arts and Culture 
3. Appropriations Standing Committee 
4. Auditor-General Standing Committee  
5. Basic Education  
6. Communications  
7. Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs 
8. Correctional Services 
9. Defence 
10. Energy 
11. Finance Standing Committee 
12. Health 
13. Higher Education  
14. Home Affairs 
15. Human Settlements  
16. International Relations and 
Cooperation  
17. Justice and Constitutional 
Development  
18. Labour  
19. Mineral Resources 
20. Police  
21. Private Members’ Legislative 
Proposals and Special Petitions 
22. Public Accounts Standing Committee 
23. Public Enterprises 
24. Public Service and Administration  
25. Public Works  
26. Rules of the National Assembly  
27. Rural Development and Land Reform  
28. Science and Technology  
29. Sport and Recreation  
30. Social Development  
31. Tourism  
32. Trade and Industry  
33. Transport  
34. Water and Environmental Affairs 
35. Women, Children and People with 
Disabilities  
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Addendum Three: Governmental Cluster Structure 
 
1. Infrastructure Development Cluster:  
Communications Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs  
Economic Development  Energy 
Finance  Human Settlements  
Public Enterprises  Public Works  
The Presidency: National Planning Commission  Transport  
Water and Environmental Affairs  
 
 
2. Economic Sectors Cluster:  
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
Economic Development  
Communications 
Finance 
Higher Education and Training  Labour 
Mineral Resources Public Enterprises 
Rural Development and Land Reform  Science and Technology  
Tourism  Trade and Industry  
 
 
3. Governance and Administration Cluster:   
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Home Affairs 
Justice and Constitutional Development  Finance 
Public Service and Administration  The Presidency: Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation  
 
 
4. Human Development Cluster:  
Arts and Culture  Basic Education  
Health Higher Education and Training  
Labour  Science and Technology  
Sport and Recreation   
 
 
5. Social Protection and Community Development Cluster:  
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs  Environmental and Water Affairs  
Human Settlements Labour 
Public Works Rural Development and Land Reform  
Social Development  Transport  
Women, Youth and People with Disabilities   
 
 
6. International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster:  
Defence and Military Veterans  International Relations and Cooperation  
Finance  Trade and Industry  
Tourism  Rural Development and Land Reform  
Water and Environmental Affairs   
 
 
7. Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster:  
Correctional Services Defence and Military Veterans  
Home Affairs  Justice and Constitutional Development  
Police  State Security  
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Addendum Four: Entities Reporting To Committees in the Sample 
1. ENERGY:   
The Central Energy Fund (CEF) Group of 
Companies (SOC) Ltd 
The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) 
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA) 
The South African Radioactive Waste Disposal 
Institute  
The South African Nuclear Energy Corporation 
(Necsa) SOC Ltd 
The South African Energy Development Institute 
(SANEDI) 
 
 
2. TRADE AND INDUSTRY:  
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
(CIPC) 
National Empowerment Fund (NEF) 
National Gambling Board (NGB) 
Export Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC) SOC 
Limited of South Africa 
National Lotteries Board (NLB) 
National Consumer Commission (NCC) National Metrology Institute of South Africa 
(NMISA) 
National Consumer Tribunal (CT) National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications 
(NRCS) 
National Credit Regulator (NCR) Small Enterprise Development Agency (Seda) 
South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) South African National Accreditation System 
(SANAS) 
Companies Tribunal   
 
 
3. CORRECTIONAL SERVICES: 0 FOR THE YEAR UNDER REVIEW   
 
4. COMMUNICATIONS: 
South African Post Office (SAPO) South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
Sentech  National Electronic Media Institute of South Africa 
Universal Service and Access Agency of South 
Africa (USAASA) 
.za Domain Name Authority  
Independent Communication Authority of South 
Africa (ICASA) 
 
 
 
5. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: 
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) National Development Agency (NDA) 
The Central Drug Authority (CDA)  
 
 
6. WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS:  
Environment: Water: 
South African National Biodiversity Agency 
(SANBI) 
Transcaledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA)  
iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority  Water Research Commission (WRC) 
South African National Parks (SANParks) Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs):  
Inkomati (ICMA) 
Breede Overberg (BOCMA) 
South African Weather Service (Saws)  Water Boards: 
Amatola Water 
Botshelo Water 
Bushbuckridge Water 
Bloem Water 
Lepelle Northern Water 
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Magalies Water 
Mhlathuza Water 
Overberg Water 
Pelladrift Water 
Rand Water 
Sedibeng Water 
Umgeni Water 
 
 
7. POLICE: 
Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP) Independent Police Investigative Directorate 
(IPID) 
Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
(PSIRA) 
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Addendum Five: Chairperson Interview Template 
 
 
 
University of Cape Town 
Master’s Dissertation; Department of Political Studies 
Survey of Parliamentary Committee Chairpersons  
 
 
You have been selected to participate in this representative survey.  You are not obliged to take part in this 
study.  You may refuse to answer any question. All of your answers will be kept strictly confidential.  Your 
name is not on this questionnaire, and your name will NEVER be used with the answers you provide.  Your 
answers will be put together with the answers of your colleagues who have also been randomly selected for this 
survey to get an overall picture of the views and opinions of the Chairpersons of this parliament.   
 
Please feel free to answer openly and honestly.   
 
If something is unclear to you, or you want further explanation, please ask me.  Most importantly, there are no 
right or wrong answers.  Instead, we are interested in what you think and your opinions.  
 
The results of this study will be used for the purposes of the Master’s Dissertation only. 
 
According to the research ethics policy of the University of Cape Town, I am obliged to tell you that there is no 
penalty for refusing to participate, and to ask you whether you wish to continue with this interview? 
 
 Hour Minute 
TIME INTERVIEW STARTED: ENTER HOUR AND MINUTE, USE 24 HR CLOCK     
 
Before we begin, let me give you a brief overview of what we will be speaking about.  While the questions may 
not be in this exact order, they all deal with these four broad areas. 
 
1. Your background and how you came to be in parliament. 
2. Your views about the role of parliament in terms of legislative oversight and your role as Chairperson. 
3. Your assessments of how parliament performs and the resources parliament makes available to you. 
4. And finally, your views about parliamentary committees. 
 
If you don’t have any questions, may we now begin? 
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A. Chairpersons’ Background 
 
I would like to begin by asking you a few things that will help us get an idea of the background of 
Chairpersons. 
 
A1 When were you first elected to the South African Parliament? (Write Down Year Elected)  
 
 
 
A2 How many years have you been a Chairperson? 
 
 
 
 
A3 What was your main occupation before entering [Parliament]?   
 
 
 
 
A4 What is your highest level of education?   
Completed college, obtained a Diploma 
Some university 
Undergraduate Degree (BA, BS) 
Post-Graduate Diploma 
Honours Degree 
Masters Degree (MA, LLM) 
Ph. D. Degree 
 
B. Recruitment 
 
B1 A.  Before you became a Chairperson, did you ever work or serve in local or provincial 
government? 
No  
Yes 
 
B. [IF YES] What kind of position was it?  DO NOT READ OPTIONS.  TICK ALL THAT APPLY 
Local or Ward Councillor (elected) 
Mayor 
Premier  
Member of Provincial Legislature  
Provincial Minister/Deputy Provincial Minister  
Senior Official in a Provincial Department or Municipality  
 
B2 A.  Before you became a Chairperson, did you ever work or serve in national government? 
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No 
Yes 
 
B. [IF YES] What kind of position was it? DO NOT READ OPTIONS.  TICK ALL THAT APPLY. 
Senior Official in a Government Department 
Chief Executive/Managing Director of Parastatal  
Senior Official in a Parastatal 
Deputy Minister 
Cabinet Minister 
Senior Official in the President’s Office  
Other: 
 
 
 
 
B3 A.  Before you became a Chairperson, did you ever hold a senior position in a political 
party (e.g. leader at the national, provincial or local level? 
Yes 
No 
 
B. [IF YES] What level of party organisation? DO NOT READ OPTIONS. TICK ALL THAT 
APPLY. 
Local (constituency, area, branch) level  
Provincial party organisation  
National party organisation  
 
C. Parliamentary Oversight  
 
C1 
How do you understand the function of performing oversight and accountability?   
 
 
C2 
In your opinion and experience, what are the biggest impediments to conducting effective 
oversight over Executive bodies? 
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C3 In your experience, have sufficient resources (e.g. budget, personnel, time, space) been 
made available to Committees to effectively conduct oversight?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C4 
How is the function of oversight carried out when considering the power that Parliament 
has to influence Executive action? 
C5  
Specifically, have there even been instances in which the Executive failed to comply with 
Committee requests?  
 
C5 Based on your experience, how would you describe the relationship between Committee 
Chairpersons and the Ministers responsible for the relevant portfolio?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C6 
How forthcoming are Executive bodies in providing information needed by Parliament to 
meaningfully carry out oversight?  
 
C7 Given your experience as Chairperson, how does a Committee reconcile party positions 
and fulfilling the mandate of oversight and accountability? 
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D. Role of the Chairperson 
 
D1 How would you describe the role of the Committee Chairperson?  
 
D2 In a year, approximately what percentage of your time is devoted to each of the 
following?   
 
A. Plenary Work  
 
Percent % 
B. Committee Work 
 
 
C. Constituency Work  
 
 
D. Party Work (outside your constituency) 
  
 
 
 
E.  Parliamentary Resources 
 
E1 In your role as a Chairperson, how would you rank the importance of these resources? 
[Tick in each column] 
  Not that 
Important  
Moderately 
Important  
Very 
Important  
A Committee staff    
B. Library/Library staff     
 C. Parliamentary research staff    
 D. Physical Infrastructure      
 E. Budget     
 F. Civil society organisations/Think 
Tanks/Universities/Academics  
   
 G Party Research Staff    
 
 
F. Committee Work 
 
 
F1 Thinking of the Committee you chaired, how would you rate: 
 Very Poor Poor Good Very Good 
A. Members’ understanding of the 
work of the Executive institutions 
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they are meant to oversee 
B. Members’ ability to ask informed 
questions during public meetings 
    
C. The quality of research provided  
 
    
D. The quality of Committee Reports  
 
    
 
 
F2 
Based on your experiences in Parliament, over the past five years, has the overall 
effectiveness of Committees increased, decreased or stayed the same when conducting 
oversight? 
Increased a great deal 1 
Increased somewhat 2 
Stayed about the same 3 
Decreased somewhat 4 
Decreased a great deal 5 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time [END OF INTERVIEW]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Hour Minute 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED: ENTER HOUR AND MINUTE, USE 24 HR 
CLOCK 
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Addendum Six: Research Associate Interview Template 
 
 
University of Cape Town 
Master’s Dissertation; Department of Political Studies 
Survey of Research Staff of the Parliament of South Africa 
You have been selected to participate in this representative survey.  You are not obliged to take part in this 
study.  You may refuse to answer any question. All of your answers will be kept strictly confidential.  Your 
name is not on this questionnaire, and your name will NEVER be used with the answers you provide.  Your 
answers will be put together with the answers of your colleagues who have also been randomly selected for this 
survey to get an overall picture of the views and opinions of the research staff of this parliament.   
Please feel free to answer openly and honestly.   
If something is unclear to you, or you want further explanation, please ask me.  Most importantly, there are no 
right or wrong answers.  Instead, I am interested in what you think and your opinions.  
The results of this study will be used for the purposes of the Master’s Dissertation only. 
According to the research ethics policy of the University of Cape Town, I am obliged to tell you that there is no 
penalty for refusing to participate, and to ask you whether you wish to continue with this interview? 
 
 Hour Minute 
TIME INTERVIEW STARTED: ENTER HOUR AND MINUTE, USE 24 HR CLOCK     
 
Before we begin, let me give you a brief overview of what we will be speaking about.  While the questions may 
not be in this exact order, they all deal with these four broad areas. 
1. Research Capacity of Parliamentary Portfolio Committees 
2. Parliamentary Portfolio Committee Budgets 
3. Parliamentary Portfolio Committee Staff 
4. And finally, your views about Parliamentary Committee resources 
 
If you don’t have any questions, may we now begin? 
 
 
A. RESEARCH CAPACITY:   
 
A1- What is your exact role [as a content advisor] on the Committee? Do you as a content advisor meet and 
consult, either on a formal or informal basis, with other content advisors on matters of mutual interest?   
 
 
A2- How long have you been a content advisor for this particular Committee? 
 
 
A3- How has your Committee sought to separate the roles and responsibilities of the content advisor, 
researchers and secretarial support functions?   
 
 
A4- What in your opinion constitutes sufficient research support for Committees? 
 
 
A5- Are Committee’s sufficiently equipped with research support?  
 
 
A6- Is research support specific to each Committee or does Parliament evenly distribute research capacity 
across all Committees?   
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A7- How is a balance maintained between parliamentary research support provided to Committees and party-
specific research provided to individual Committee Members?   
 
 
A8- Does the Committee ever solicit research from external sources like civil society organisations, academics or 
think tanks?  
 
 
 
B. COMMITTEE BUDGETS:  
 
 
B1- How are Committee budgets determined?  Are budgets Committee specific or is there a uniform budget for 
Committees across the board?  
 
 
 
B2- Who is responsible for managing Committee budgets?  
 
 
C.COMMITTEE STAFF:  
 
C1- Are Committees provided with sufficient non-research staff?  
 
C2- Do Committee staff, secretarial and non-secretarial, fulfil any plenary duties or do their responsibilities lie 
exclusively with the Committee?  
 
 
 
D. COMMITTEE RESOURCES:  
 
D1- Are Committees provided with sufficient physical resources? This is in reference to meeting room space, 
office space, work related material, technology, audio etc.  
 
 
D2- Is Parliament’s research unit adequately equipped to meet the research needs of the Committee? [this 
applies both in terms of quantitative and qualitative sufficiency]  
 
 
Thank you very much for your time [END OF INTERVIEW]  
 
 Hour Minute 
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED: ENTER HOUR AND MINUTE, USE 24 HR CLOCK     
 
 
